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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over these consolidated cases pursuant to section 78-22(3)(j) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Whether the district courts properly dismissed claims brought by Mr. Estes

against the named district court judges on the basis that he failed to comply with the
notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§
63-30-11,-12.
This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Citv of St. George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932
(Utah 1993).
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Tibbs R. 36-37, 14647, and 179-80;' Rigtrup R. 35-36, 153-54, and 173-74;2 SawayaR. 26-28,154-55, and
185-86.3
2.

Whether the district courts properly dismissed claims brought by Mr. Estes

against the named district court judges on the basis that those claims were barred by
applicable statutes of limitation.

1

The record in Estes v. Tibbs. Dist. Ct. No. 960601239 (6th Dist. Ct), is referred
to herein as "Tibbs R."
2

The record in Estes v. Rigtrup. Dist. Ct. No. 960905255 CV (3rd Dist. Ct), is
referred to herein as "Rigtrup R."
3

The record in Estes v. Sawava. Dist. Ct. No. 96090955 CV (3rd Dist. Ct), is
referred to herein as "Sawaya R."

1

This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See
Gramlich v. Munsey. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992): see also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994); City of St George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 1993).
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Tibbs R. 37-38, 14647, and 180; Rigtrup R. 36-37, 154, and 173-74; SawayaR. 28-29, 155, and 185-86.
3.

Whether the district courts properly dismissed claims brought by Mr. Estes

on the grounds that those claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); City of St. George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932
(Utah 1993).
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Rigtrup R. 37-39,
155-56, and 173-74; SawayaR. 29-31, 154-58, and 185-86.4
4.

Whether the district courts properly ruled that Mr. Estes' failed to state a

claim for relief under section 78-35-1 of the Utah Code because the conduct of the district
court judges, as alleged in the complaint, was not "wrongful[] or willful[]" as a matter of
law.
This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Citv of St. George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932
(Utah 1993).
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Rigtrup R. 39-42,
4

The district court in the Tibbs case rejected the Judge's argument that Mr.
Estes' claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and, consequently, this is
not an issue in that case.
2

156-57, and 173-74; SawayaR. 31-33, 154-58, and 185-86.5
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §78-35-1:
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a
court, who wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of
habeas corpus whenever proper application for the same has been
made shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the party
thereby aggrieved.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 :
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would
apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental
entity, or against an employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice
of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized
as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claiming so far as they
are known.
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's
agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible
governmental entity according to the requirement of
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.
(4)
(a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian
at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply
to the court to extend the time for service of notice
of claim.
5

The district court in the Tibbs case rejected the Judge's argument that Mr. Estes
had failed to state a claim under section 78-35-1 and, consequently, this is not an issue in
that case.
3

(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity,
the court may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds
the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension,
the court shall consider whether the delay in serving the
notice of claim will substantially prejudice the
governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1):
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which
results from the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical,
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program
conducted in either public or private facilities.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5):
"Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person,
or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or
his agent.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-29:
An action may be brought within one year:
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state;
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the
action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state,
except when the statute imposing it prescribes a different
limitation;
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal
action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state;
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or
seduction;
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a
prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal
process;
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries
to property caused by a mob or riot;
(7) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under the
following sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent
4

Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific
situations limits the time for action to four years, under
Section 25-6-10; or
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2).
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25:
An action may be brought within four years:
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded
upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods,
wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store
account; also on an open account for work, labor or services
rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years
after the last charge is made or the last payment is received;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific
situations limits the time for action to one year, under
Section 25-6-10;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1);
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
Relevant portions of any other statute or rule are set forth in the body of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
These consolidated cases stem from the dismissal of three "petitions"6 filed by
Mr. Estes, acting pro se, against three district court judges. [Tibbs R. 1-3; Rigtrup R. 1-3;
Sawaya R. 1-2]. Although the factual basis for each complaint is slightly different, all
were filed pursuant to section 78-35-1 of the Utah Code, contending that the named
defendants "wrongfully and willfully refiise[d] to allow a writ of habeas corpus when[]
6

Although the pleadings were styled "Petition for Recovery of Monetary
Penalty," they have at all times been treated as complaints, filed in accordance with Rules
3 and 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
5

proper application for the same" had been made by Mr. Estes. See Utah Code Ann. § 7835-1.7
The complaint against Judge Tibbs stems from the following facts, which Mr.
Estes has alleged violate section 78-35-1: (i) Judge Tibbs dismissed a habeas petition
filed by Mr. Estes8 on the sole ground he had named as the defendant the warden of the
Central Utah Correctional Facility who was not alleged to have deprived Mr. Estes of any
constitutional right, but whose only connection to Mr. Estes was the fact that he was
warden of the prison where Mr. Estes was housed;9 (ii) Following remand of that case,
Mr. Estes amended his writ to join the Utah Board of Pardons, but when he attempted to
file it, the court informed him that the Sixth Circuit Court, where he originally filed the
writ, no longer existed; and (iii) When Mr. Estes was finally able to locate the proper
court to file the amended writ, the court refused to accept it without a filing fee or writ of
impecuniosity, even though it was an amendment to his original writ, and even though
Utah law prohibits charging a filing fee. [Tibbs R. 1-3].

7

Section 78-35-1 provides,
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who
wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever
proper application for the same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum
not exceeding $5,000 to the party thereby aggrieved.

8

Mr. Estes' petition challenged the constitutionality of conduct by the Board of
Pardons following this Court's decision in Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991).
9

Mr. Estes subsequently appealed Judge Tibbs' ruling. The Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed on a different basis. That court held the Board of Pardons, in addition
to the warden, should have been named defendants. Estes v. Van Per Veur, 824 P.2d
1200, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
6

The complaint against Judge Rigtrup stems from the following facts, which Mr.
Estes has alleged violate section 78-35-1: On or about April 5, 1990, Judge Rigtrup
denied a writ of habeas corpus filed by Mr. Estes10 on the grounds that the issues it raised
(i) were identical to issues previously raised by Mr. Estes on the appeal of his conviction,
or were raised and decided on appeal, and (ii) Mr. Estes had failed to allege "unusual
circumstances" justifying an exception to the general rule that a petitioner may not raise
issues in postconviction proceedings that could and should have been raised on direct
appeal. [Rigtrup R. 44-45]. n During the hearing on the motion to dismiss his writ, Judge
Rigtrup stated "[t]his Court cannot correct another district judge, or second guess him,
because of his judgement exercised in sentencing." [Rigtrup. R. 1-2]. Mr. Estes also
offered the Court evidence of "unusual circumstances" justifying an exception to the
general rule regarding issues that may be raised in postconviction proceedings. [Rigtrup
R. 2]. In his complaint, Mr. Estes alleges Judge Rigtrup's conduct amounts to a
wrongful and willful refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus. [Rigtrup R. 1-2].
The complaint against Judge Sawaya stems from the following facts, which Mr.
Estes has alleged violate section 78-35-1: Following Judge Rigtrup's dismissal of Mr.
Estes' writ, he filed a habeas petition in the Third District Court, which was assigned to
Judge Sawaya. [Sawaya R. 1]. In this petition, Mr. Estes sought to raise a claim for
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The ineffectiveness claim was based upon
10

Mr. Estes originally filed his writ in this Court, and the Court referred it to the
Third District Court.
11

Mr. Estes appealed Judge Rigtrup's decision to this Court, and the Court
denied Mr. Estes' petition. [Rigtrup R. 45].
7

appellate counsel's refusal to raise a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
[Sawaya R. 47]. The State moved to dismiss the petition.12 Relying on Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Judge Sawaya dismissed the petition on the
grounds that Mr. Estes had failed to demonstrate why this issue had not been previously
raised in the habeas petition that had been dismissed by Judge Rigtrup. [Sawaya R. 4748].13 Rule 4-501, however, expressly states that it "does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501,
Applicability. Mr. Estes' complaint alleges that Judge Sawaya's reliance on Rule 4-501
as a basis for dismissing his habeas petition amounts to a wrongful and willful refusal to
issue a writ of habeas corpus. [Sawaya R. 1-2].
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
On July 26, 1996, Mr. Estes filed his complaint against Judge Tibbs in the Sixth
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah. [Tibbs R. 1-2]. On or
about November 7, 1996, the Judge filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) and (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure along with a supporting
memorandum of points and authorities. [Tibbs R. 33-143].14 The Judge's motion was

12

Although it is not clear from the record, it appears that Mr. Estes was not given
an opportunity to respond to the State's motion to dismiss.
13

Mr. Estes appealed Judge Sawaya's dismissal and, on October 18, 1991, the
Utah Court of Appeals, in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, affirmed Judge Sawaya's
ruling. [Sawaya R. 49-51]. The court of appeals, however, did not consider the Rule 4501 issue. [LI]
14

Although counsel for the Judge ostensibly brought the motion under Rule
12(b)(6) and (1), counsel submitted to the district court two affidavits and a number of
unverified documents in support of the motion. Thus, the motion should have been
8

briefed and, following oral argument, the district court dismissed Mr. Estes complaint on
the grounds that his claim (i) was barred because he failed to comply with notice
provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -12; and
(ii) was barred by the statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25, -29. [Tibbs R.
179-80]. The district court did not mention, and therefore implicitly rejected, the Judge's
arguments that Mr. Estes' claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and that
the conduct Mr. Estes alleged did not amount to a violation of section 78-35-1 as a matter
of law. On March 17, 1997, Mr. Estes filed a Notice of Appeal. [Tibbs R. 179].
On July 29, 1996, Mr. Estes filed his complaint against Judge Rigtrup in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. [Rigtrup R. 1-3]. On or about
November 6, 1996, the Judge filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) and (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure along with a supporting
memorandum of points and authorities. [Sawaya R. 29-149].15 This memorandum raised
the exact same issues as the motion filed in the Tibbs case. Following briefing and oral
argument, the district court dismissed Mr. Estes complaint on the grounds that his claim
(i) failed to comply with notice provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act; (ii)
was barred by the statute of limitations; (iii) was barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel because substantially similar claims had been asserted by Mr. Estes in a federal

brought pursuant to Rule 56, and should be treated by this Court as a motion for summary
judgment.
15

Again, counsel for the Judge offered evidence outside the pleadings in support
of the motion, and the motion therefore must be treated as a motion for summary
judgment.
9

court action against Judge Rigtrup, among others; and (iv) was barred because the
conduct alleged by Mr. Estes did not amount to a violation of section 78-35-1 as a matter
of law. [Rigtrup R. 173-74]. On March 17, 1997, Mr. Estes filed a Notice of Appeal.
[Rigtrup R. 179].
On August 26, 1996, Mr. Estes filed his complaint against Judge Sawaya in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. [Sawaya R. 1-2]. On
November 6, 1996, the Judge filed a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum
seeking dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those set forth in the Tibbs
and Rigtrup cases. [Sawaya R. 21-147]. Following briefing and oral argument, the
district court dismissed the complaint on the same grounds as the Rigtrup case. [Sawaya
R. 185-87]. Mr. Estes filed his Notice of Appeal on March 17, 1997. [Sawaya R. 188].
This Court consolidated all three cases for purposes of appeal, and appointed
counsel to represent Mr. Estes.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A statement of facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case set forth
above is not necessary to the resolution of the issues presented in this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court incorrectly dismissed Mr. Estes' complaints on the
grounds they were barred by the notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. That Act, however, does not apply to Mr. Estes' claims under section 7835-1 because his claims are not for an "injury" as that term is defined in the
Governmental Immunity Act. Mr. Estes' claims also were dismissed as untimely.
10

However, neither the Judges, nor the district courts, have properly considered Mr. Estes'
argument that the limitation period should be tolled.
Two of Mr. Estates' complaints were dismissed as being barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. That doctrine, however, does not apply because the claims he asserted
in federal court against the Judges were different than the claims raised in the complaints
below; and in addition, the federal court claims were not competently, fully, and fairly
litigated. Finally, two of the district courts concluded that Mr. Estes had not stated a
claim for violation of § 78-35-1. Mr. Estes maintains that these decisions were erroneous
and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES'
CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT.
In each of the consolidated cases, the district courts dismissed Mr. Estes'

complaints on the ground that he had failed to comply with the notice-of-claim provisions
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11(2), -12, -15. The
district courts found that because Mr. Estes had failed to provide written notice to the
Attorney General's office within one year after Mr. Estes' claims arose, his lawsuits were
jurisdictionally barred. [Tibbs R. 179-80; Rigtrup R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87].
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, including its notice-of-claim provisions,
does not apply to Mr. Estes' claims under section 78-35-1 of the Utah Code. The
Governmental Immunity Act provides governmental entities limited immunity from suit
for any "injury" which results from, among other things, the exercise of a governmental
11

function. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. The notice-of-claim provision states, "[a]ny
person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against an employee for
an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties . . . shall file a written
notice of claim . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (emphasis added). The act defines
"injury" as "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a
private person or his agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5).
Mr. Estes' suits under section 78-35-1 are not claims for "injury" as that term is
defined in the Governmental Immunity Act. Instead, Mr. Estes seeks recovery of a fine or
penalty imposed by the legislature on a class of public officials for specific category of
wrongful conduct. The injury Mr. Estes complains of— wrongful refusal to issue a writ
of habeas corpus ~ is not an injury to his person or property.16 The fact that the statute
imposes a fine of $5,000 regardless of individual circumstances demonstrates that the
statute is not intended to compensate a plaintiff for personal injuries caused by
wrongfully refusing to issue a writ.17
Requiring a notice of claim would not further the policy justifications for the
notice-of-claim requirement. "[A] notice of claim provides the governmental unit with an

16

The fact that the statute defines "injury" by reference to conduct "that would be
actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent" is significant. No one other than a
judge may violate section 78-35-1 and, consequently, the conduct would not "be
actionable if inflicted by a private person . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5).
17

If the Governmental Immunity Act were found to apply to claims under section
78-35-1, then it would logically apply to any action brought against a government official
to require that official's compliance with the law.
12

opportunity to promptly investigate and to remedy any defect immediately, before
additional injury is caused; it helps avoid unnecessary litigation; it minimizes difficulties
that might arise from changes in administrations." Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192,
193 (Utah 1977). Providing notice of a violation of section 78-35-1 would not further
any of these goals because the harm cannot be remedied, nor can the fine be imposed,
without further action by a court. The violation is complete and uncorrectable when
made and cannot be remedied, either for the petitioner effected or anyone else, by any
amount of investigation the Attorney General or the Administrative Office of the Courts.
The district courts incorrectly ruled that Mr. Estes' claims were barred by the notice
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES5
CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In each of the consolidated cases, the district courts also dismissed Mr. Estes'
complaints on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations. [Tibbs R.

179-80; Rigtrup R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87]. Mr. Estes filed his complaints against
Judges Tibbs and Rigtrup in July 1996, and he filed his action against Judge Sawaya in
August 1996. [Tibbs R. 1-3; Rigtrup R. 1-3; Sawaya R. 1-2]. The conduct giving rise to
the claim against Judge Tibbs' occurred in late 1991 and early 1992. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. The
conduct giving rise to the claim against Judge Rigtrup occurred in April 1990 [Rigtrup R.
43-46], and the conduct giving rise to the claim against Judge Sawaya occurred in July
1990 [Sawaya R. 47-48]. The Judges have argued, and Mr. Estes agrees, that his claims

13

are subject to the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 78-12-29.18
The district courts, however, failed to address Mr. Estes' argument that the
limitations period should be tolled. Mr. Estes argued below that the limitations period
should have been tolled during the time he was incarcerated. In addition, the limitations
period should have been tolled during the pendency of an action filed by Mr. Estes in
federal court raising similar issues against these defendants. Both of these issues raise
factual questions that preclude summary judgment and which cannot be resolved on the
basis of the record before this Court.
This Court may affirm the district courts grant of summary judgment only if there
are no disputed issues of material fact, and the Court concludes that the Judges are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56; In re West. 948 P.2d 351
(Utah 1997). In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the Court must view all facts
in the light most favorable to Mr. Estes. Hipwell v. IHC Hosp.. 944 P.2d 327, 328 (Utah
1997). In the proceedings below, the Judges failed to address the factual and legal
argument made by Mr. Estes concerning tolling the statute of limitations, and offered no
evidence on the subject. Similarly, the district courts did not make any findings or rule
18

This concession by the Judges bolsters the arguments set forth in Part I above
regarding the inapplicability of the Government Immunity Act's notice provisions to
these claims — the Judges agree that Mr. Estes' claim is "[a]n action . . . upon a statute for
a penalty or forfeiture," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(2), and therefore not an action for
injury to person or property.
If, however, the one-year statute of limitations does not apply, Mr. Estes' claims
would be governed by the residual four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 7812-25(3) of the Utah Code. Regardless of which limitations period applies, however,
factual questions regarding tolling of the statute of limitations preclude dismissal of Mr.
Estes' claims.
14

directly on this issue.
This Court has recognized that a statute of limitations will be tolled in
"exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule would be 'irrational
or unjust.'" See Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). '"The
ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances that render
the application of a statute of limitations irrational or unjust' is a balancing test. The
balancing test weighs the hardships imposed on the claimant by the application of the
statute of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of
time." I d (quoting Warren v. Provo Citv Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)).
Factors the Court considers include whether the defendant's problems caused by the
passage of time are greater than the plaintiffs . . . whether the claim has aged to the point
that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the parties cannot
remember basic events." Id (citing Klinger v. Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990)
and Mvers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)).
In this case, Mr. Estes argued below that the limitations period should have been
tolled during the time he was in prison because, among other things, he lacked access to a
lawyer or a legal library that would have permitted him to pursue his claims.19 [Tibbs R.
151-52] Mr. Estes argued, in essence, that it would be "irrational or unjust" not to toll the
statute of limitations. The balancing test supports this argument. The Judges will not
19

Prior to 1987, section 78-12-36 of the Utah Code provided that limitations
period would be tolled during the period the plaintiff "was imprisoned on a criminal
charge." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1987); see also Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788,
790 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 1987, however, the legislature deleted this provision from
section 78-12-36.
15

suffer any hardship if the statute is tolled because all of the relevant evidence is set forth
in the various records of the proceedings and there are no witnesses to be located. Mr.
Estes, on the other hand, would lose his cause of action if the statute were applied. He
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district courts' rulings on the statute of
limitations issue or, alternatively, remand these cases to the district courts for more
particularized findings on the balancing factors applicable to claims for equitable tolling.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES'
CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL.
The district courts in the Rigtrup and Sawaya cases also dismissed Mr. Estes'

claims on the ground that they were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [Rigtrup
R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87]. The district court in the Tibbs case declined to dismiss
the complaint on this basis. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. The Judges argued that Mr. Estes had raised
these claims in a civil conspiracy lawsuit he had previously filed in federal court. That
lawsuit named the individual Judges as defendants, and was dismissed in 1995 for failing
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A copy of Mr. Estes' complaint, and
the Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba, are included in the
Addendum.20
Mr. Estes asserted, as part of his alleged civil conspiracy, the conduct of Judges
Tibbs, Rigtrup, and Sawaya that gives rise to these cases. [Tibbs R. 79-80]. He did not,
however, assert claims against any of them for violation of section 78-35-1. A party may

20

Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba's Report and Recommendation was adopted by
Chief Judge David Winder, and Mr. Estes' complaint was dismissed on April 12, 1995.
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be collaterally estopped from asserting a claim if the following conditions are met:
First, the party must show that the issue challenged in the case at hand is identical
to the issue decided in the previous action. Second, the issue in the previous
action must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits. Third, the issue
in the previous action must have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated.
Fourth, the opposing party in the action at hand must have been either a party or
privy to the previous action.
Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). Although it
is undisputed that the second and fourth elements are satisfied, the other requirements
have not been met. The issue decided in the federal action is not identical to the issue in
the underlying cases. While the federal lawsuit was based upon the same factual
predicate, it alleged claims for civil conspiracy in violation of the federal constitution and
statutes. Mr. Estes did not assert a claim for violation of section 78-35-1, which is the
sole claim raised in these cases. In addition, the issues were not competently, fully, and
fairly litigated because the case was dismissed on motion before any discovery and Mr.
Estes was representing himself, pro se, against numerous attorneys for the various
defendants. The rulings by the district courts in the Rigtrup and Sawaya cases relying on
the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a bar to Mr. Estes' claims are erroneous and should
be reversed.
IV.

MR. ESTES' COMPLAINTS STATED CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF
MAY BE GRANTED.
The district courts in the Rigtrup and Sawaya cases also dismissed Mr. Estes'

claims on the ground that they failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
[Rigtrup R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87]. Again, the district court in the Tibbs case
declined to dismiss the complaint on this basis. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. In each of the cases, the
17

Judges argued that their conduct was not "wrongful" or "willful" and therefore Mr. Estes
had not stated a claim for relief under section 78-35-1. Mr. Estes contends there are
factual issues which preclude entry of summary judgment, or dismissal on the basis of
Rule 12(b)(6), and the cases should be remanded for trial. Specifically, Mr. Estes
contends that each of the named defendants violated section 78-35-1 for the following
reasons.
A.

Estes v. Tibbs.

First, Judge Tibbs dismissed Mr. Estes' habeas petition on the ground that he had
named as the sole defendant the acting warden of the Central Utah Correctional Facility
who, he ruled, had not violated any of Mr. Estes' constitutional rights. Mr. Estes
contends this ruling was incorrect21 and violated section 78-35-1.
Second, following remand of this case from the court of appeals, Mr. Estes
amended his writ to name the Utah Board of Pardons, but the district court notified him
that it would not be accepted because the Sixth Circuit Court, where he originally filed
his writ, no longer existed. Mr. Estes contends this conduct violates section 78-35-1.
Third, when Mr. Estes tried to file the amended writ in the Sixth District Court,
the court refused to accept it without a filing fee or writ of impecuniosity. Mr. Estes
contends this conduct violates section 78-35-1 because, among other things, he was
attempting to amend his original writ (which was filed without a filing fee or writ of

21

This ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals on different grounds.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the warden was properly a party, but Mr. Estes also
should have named as a defendant the Utah Board of Pardons. Estes v. Van Per Veur,
824 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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THE CORRECTION
[I, the Plaintiff Newton Estes, believes this correction should
be made prior to the AG's response; whereas my counsel believes it
could just as well come after,]
Delete under A. Estes v. Tibbs;
Mr. Estes 1
"First, Judge Tibbs dismissed^ habeas corpus
petition on the ground that he had named as the sole
defendant the acting warden of the Utah Correctional
Facility who, he ruled, had not violated any of Mr.
Estes' constitutional rights."
Instead, make it to read:
"First, Judge Tibbs dismissed Mr. Estes 1 habeas
petition on the sole ground that he had named as
defendant the warden of the Central Utah Correctional
Facility who, as he ruled in accordance with the AG T s
Argument, had not been alleged to have taken one action
f
that would deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional
rights or liberties. Indeed, the only connection
between Plaintiff and Mr. Van Der Veur is the fact
that Mr. Van Der Veur is the Warden of the prison
where Plaintiff is housed. 1 "
The differences are important because saying "sole defendant"
makes it seem Tibbs may have ruled there should have been an
additional defendant.

That could lend substance to what happened

to my appeal,wherein the Court of Appeals in Estes v. Van Der Veur
824 P.2d

1201(1992), stated I had been properly dismissed in the

"court below" on the ground I had failed to name the Board of
Pardons as an additional defendant.
As quoted above, no such suggestion had ever been made by
Judge Tibbs (or the Attorney General) in the court below.
DATED t h i s ^ / ^ d a y

of April, 1998.

jfyuAyt^C^ Y ^ W ^

By
Newton C. Estes

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that on this'lg^Kilay
of April, 1998, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Correction to Page
18 to Assistant AG Brent A. Burnett, 160 E. 300 South, Salt Lake
City 84144.

%IA£^6,&&*&0—
Newton C. Estes

IP

impecuniosity) and because section 21-7-2(2)(c) of the Utah Code states that no filing
fees may be charged "in cases of habeas corpus . . . . "
B.

Estes v. Rigtrup.

Judge Rigtrup denied Mr. Estes' writ of habeas corpus and, during the hearing on
that writ, stated "[t]his Court cannot correct another district judge, or second guess him,
because of his judgement exercised in sentencing." [Rigtrup. R. 1-2]. Mr. Estes contends
this comment, combined with the denial of his writ, violates section 78-35-1.
Judge Rigtrup also refused to accept the evidence offered by Mr. Estes of
"unusual circumstances" justifying an exception to the general rule regarding issues that
may be raised in postconviction proceedings. He maintains that this is violates section
78-35-1.
C.

Estes v. Sawaya.

Following the dismissal by Judge Rigtrup, Mr. Estes filed a habeas petition in
Third District Court that was assigned to Judge Sawaya. The State filed and briefed a
motion to dismiss, and the district court, relying on Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, dismissed the petition on the grounds that Mr. Estes had failed to
demonstrate why this issue had not been previously raised. Mr. Estes contends that Judge
Sawaya's dismissal violated section 78-35-1 because Rule 4-501 expressly states that it
"does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. Utah
Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501, Applicability.

19

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests that the orders entered
by the district courts in each of these consolidated cases be reversed, and that the cases be
remanded for trials on the merits.
DATED this

of April, 1998.
SNELL & WILMER

Todd M. Shai
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

of April, 1998,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be sent to the following,
via United States Mail, postage prepaid:
Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Heber Wells Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

SHAUGHT\SLC\061015.01
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Estes v. Tibbs, Order of Dismissal
Estes v. Rigtrup. Order of Dismissal
Estes v. Sawaya. Order of Dismissal
Estes v. Tibbs. Notice of Appeal
Estes v. Rigtrup. Notice of Appeal
Estes v. Sawaya. Notice of Appeal
Estes v. Namba. et aL Amended Complaint of Conspiracy to Deny Civil Rights
Estes v. Namba. et al. Report and Recommendation
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Assistant Attorney General
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Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
Judge Don V. Tibbs
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801)366-0100
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
:

ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 960601239

JUDGE DON V. TIBBS,
Defendants.

:

Judge Kay L. Mclff

:

This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of February, 1997 at
11:00 a.m. before the Honorable Kay L. Mclff, Judge of the above entitled court on the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally
present and appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John
P. Soltis. The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral
argument and being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order:
1.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalties ($15,000) for THREE 78-35-1 Violations
is dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah

Code Ann. §§63-30-11, -12 and plaintiff s civil action is jurisdictionally barred;
2.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalties ($15,000) for THREE 78-35-1 Violations
is dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the
Judicial Code, Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally

c^^y?f?*\l&~-— i//f»
DATEDLthis^X day of W iHUkh, 1997.
SBY THE COURT

IG CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER,

.St

this^l

day of February, 1997, to the following:
Newton C. Estes
372 East 700 North
Kaysville, UT 84037
(801) 544-5253

w

V»flJ>u- foxl

JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM-1231
Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
Judge James Kenneth Rigtrup
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801)366-0100

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

NEWTON C. ESTES,
Plaintiff Pro Se,

: ^y
/
/

vs.

Civil No. 960905255 CV
/

JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP,

:

/

Judge Robert K. Hilder
Defendant.

:

This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 12th day of February, 1997 at 8:00 a.m.
before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge of the above entitled court on the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally present and
appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John P. Soltis.
The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral argument and
being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order:

i-i

1.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs

Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with
prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§63-3011,-12 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred;
2.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs

Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with
prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the Judicial Code, Utah
Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred;
3.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs

Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with
prejudice by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and
4.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs

Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
DATED t h i s ^ day O^^JJ^XM^

^>1997.

BY THE COURT

JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, this
/ Q J L day of February, 1997, to the following:
Newton C. Estes
372 East 700 North
Kaysville, UT 84037
(801) 544-5253
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JOHN P. SOLUS - 3040
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM-1231
Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
Judge James S. Sawaya
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801)366-0100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
Plaintiff,
ivil No. 960905955 CV
vs.

Judge Robert K. Hilder
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA,
Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 12th day of February, 1997 at
8:00 a.m. before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge of the above entitled court on the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally
present and appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John
P. Soltis. The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral
argument and being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order:

1.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed
with prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§63-30-11, -12 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred;
2.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed
with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the Judicial Code,
Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred;
3.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed
with prejudice by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and
4.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
DATED this«ffi~day

0

f < ^ X ^ ^ y

, 1997

OBERT K. HILDER

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER,
this /^rMay of February, 1997, to the following:
Newton C. Estes
372 East 700 North
Kaysville, UT 84037
(801)544-5253

i \J)HJ
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Newton C. Estes
372 East 700 North
Kaysville, Ut 84037
Tel: 801/544-5253

FILED
SANPETr '.'DJNTY. UTAH
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IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COtf&fKfr' UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
Plaintiff

Pro Se,

-vsJUDGE DON V. TIBBS,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No. 960601239
Judge Kay L. Mclff

Defendant.
I hereby file this Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court of Judge Mclff's March 5, 1997 Order of Dismissal with
Prejudice of my Petition For Recovery of Monetary Penalties
($15,000) For Three 78-35-1 Violations.
Affidavit of impecuniosity attached.

/Wt^T6xfe*£L.
Newton C. Estes
March 17, 1997

Certificate of Mailing: I hereby certify that on this 17th
day of March, 1997, I mailed a copy of the above Notice of Appeal
to defendant's defense counsel and assistant attorney general,
John P. Soltis at P.O. Box 140856, Salt Lake City 84114.

/llLi^C^h

C.

Newton C. Estes

i<t^

Newton C. estes
372 East 700 North
Kaysville, UT 84037

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff Pro Se,
-vsJUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP
Case No.s'
and
JUDGE JAMES SAWAYA,
Defendants.

Jud'ge Rober

Hilder

/

I hereby file this Notice of Appeal[s] to the Utah Supreme
Court of Judge Hilderfs February 28, 1997 Orders of Dismissal of
my Petition[s] for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) For 7835-1 Violation[s] against the two judges captioned above.
Affidavit of impecuniosity attached.

%!.&«.£.&&.
Newton C. Estes
March 17, 1997
Certificate of Mailing: I hereby certify that on this 17th
day of March> 1997, T ma iled a copy of this Notice of Appeal to
defendants' defense counsel and assistant attorney general, John
P. Soltis at P.O. Box 140856, Salt Lake City 84114.
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Newton C. Estes
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Newton C. estes
372 East 700 North
Kaysville, UT 84037
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
NOTICE OF APPEAL[S]
Plaintiff Pro Se,

/

-vsJUDGE KENNETH RIGTRU?
Case Nos
and
JUDGE JAMES SAWAYA,

fudge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants.

I hereby file this Notice of Appealfs] to the Utah Supreme
Court of Judge HilderTs February 28, 1997 Orders of Dismissal of
my Petition[s] for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) For 7835-1 Violation[s] against the two judges captioned above.
Affidavit of impecuniosity attached.

&>

Newton C. Estes
March 17, 1997
Certificate of Mailing: I hereby certify that on this 17th
day of March, 1 9 g 7 j j ma iled a copy of this Notice of Appeal to
defendants' defense counsel and assistant attorney general, John
P. Soltis at P.O. Box 140856, Salt Lake City 84114.

Newton C. Estes
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Newton C. Estes
372 East 700 North
Kaysville, UT 84037
Ph: 544-5253
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT' COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
NEWTON C. ESTES,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED
Pro Se

COMPLAINT OF CONSPIRACY

vs.

TO DENY CIVIL RIGHTS

94-NC-Q89

25 CONSPIRATORS IN APPROXIMATE
C a s e No

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF THEIR
PARTICIPATION:

1) BRIAN NAMBA, Davis County prosecutor;
d e f e n s e attorney and public defender;
4) Judge DOUGLAS CORNABY:
LARSEN, A s s i s t a n t AG;
SAWAYA:

2) STEVE VANDERLINDEN,

3) JUDY VALEIKA, AP&P i n v e s t i g a t o r ;

5 ) JAY EDMONDS, appeal attorney;

7) Judge KENNETH RIGTRUP;

8) Judge JAMES

9) CRAIG LUDWIG, Third D i s t r i c t Court Clerk;

DAVID SAM;

11)

ANGELA MICKLOS, A s s i s t a n t AG;

past Corrections d i r e c t o r ;

10) Federal Judge

12) GARY DeLAND,

13) LANE McCOTTER, Corrections d i r e c t o r ;

14) ELDON BARNES, former Draper warden;
Gunnison warden;

6) DAN

15) FRED VAN DER VEUR,

16) PETE HAUN, former Parole Board chairman;

MICHAEL SIBBETT, Parole Board chairman;

18) LORENZO MILLER,

17)
Assistant

AG;
19) Judge DON TIBBS;
2 0 ) KIRK TORGENSEN, A s s i s t a n t AG;
Presiding
21) Judge MICHAEL J . MURPHY;
22) Judge JOHN WAHLQUIST;
23) DAVID
CARLSON, A s s i s t a n t AG;
25) P .

24) DEAN W. SHEFFIELD, J u d i c i a l Conduct Commission;

GARY FERRERO, Utah S t a t e Bar,
Defendants.

1.

INTRODUCTION
This complaint is about a conspiracy to nullify plea bargains by suspending habeas corpus review of courtroom victims receiving original-charge
punishments througn the use of false secret information by the sentencing judge
and parole board.

The purpose is to achieve the same result without the cost of

a trial.
JURISDICTION
This action arises under the Constitution of cne United States, plus
the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to it, as well as Title 42
United States Code Section 1883, 42 USC 1985, 42 USC 1986, 28 USC 1331, 18 USC
241 &242 and the 1871 Civil Rights Enforcement Act.
Title 28 USC 1343 confers jurisdiction upon this Court to conduct the
trial.

Plaintiff, Newton C. Estes, is a citizen of tne United States of
America and a resident of Kaysville, Davis County in the State of Utah.
Defendants, at the time material to this action, were duly elected,
appointed, or otherwise employed by this State or the U.S. government. Accordingly, all actions complained of were undertaken under color of state law or
under the authority of the United States.
NOTE:

IF THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE MY RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE AS A

VICTIM QUALIFIES ME AS ONE WHO WILL BE ABLE TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE INTERESTS
OF A CLASS OF A POSSIBLE 1000 OTHER VICTIMS, I NOW SUGGEST CONVERTING THIS TO
A CLASS ACTION SUIT.
This conversion could be accompanied by a preliminary announcement that
this Court would strictly adhere to the same requirements of leniency the law

2.

has imposed upon it in individual pro se civil rights complaints*

Specifically,

that causes of action are to be accorded reasonable intent so that close calls will
always be decided in favor of the pleader, and that timely notice of any serious
deficiencies will enable me to amend effectively.

1) BRIAN NAMBA, Davis County prosecutor, at Davis County Court Complex,
800 West State Street, Farmington, UT, started his participation in the conspiracy
to nullify plea bargains at my January 1988 arraignment in the circuit court in
Layton when, after I had asked him to recommend an attorney, he named Steve Vanderlinden.

I had believed he would of course name one who would adhere to the mecha-

nics of due process so that coming events would not be tainted.
a)

Instead, he named one whom he knew had been involved in an 18-year

conspiracy to keep defendants from ever getting the due process of 6th Amendment
hearings to challenge lies called out by the judge from documents Vanderlinden
either never presented or did not examine with them.
b)

Furthermore, upon information and belief, he as prosecutor was the

due course author of the frame-up June 21, 1988 affidavit in case D.C. #1-5983
admitting to the original charges Vanderlinden had tried to get me to sign—thus
conspiring to violate my 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination.
In addition to violating the Constitution, the above conduct also violates
Utah's canon of ethicsT "duty to uphold legal process...[and being a factor] in
preserving government under law..." The law involving tested-for-accuracy presentence reports is embodied in the Lipsey, Casarez and Howell decisions.
Discovery will determine how many defendants prosecuted by Namba and
defended by Vanderlinden got to examine their PSI reports for accuracy.
I will put in evidence the original-charge affidavit Vanderlinden tried
to get me to sign whose authorship will be derermined at trial, or by the defendants
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sworn answer to this complaint that prosecutors never prepare the words and intent
of plea bargain affidavits.
iMy ACTUAL INJURY was 5 years in prison for which I ask the Court and
jury to require Namba to pay me a proportional $25,000 for having thus deliberately conspired to cripple, rather than uphold legal process.

Punitive damages will

depend on his testimony.
2)

STEVE VANDERLINDEN, defense attorney and public defender who lived at

3208 S. North Canyon Circle in Bountiful, UT, participated in the conspirecy described above by:
a) trying to trick me into pleading guilty to the original charges as
contained in an affidavit dated June 21, 1988.
b) after that had failed when I discovered the deception and demanded
the words be changed, he set out to deprive me of my 5th and 6th Amendment rights
not to be punished without due process of law and confronting my accusers extended
to all by the 14th Amendment by failing to obtain my presentence report available
to him the previous Friday, July 15 until 20 minutes before the scheduled 9 AM Tues.
sentencing.

This allowed totally insufficient time to locate and challenge the

lies I discovered in its many pages (PSI reporter Judy Valeika said it was the
largest ever prepared in Davis County) after the Utah Supreme Court finally arranged for me to be provided a copy.
c) After not having turned one page or read one sentence while me and my
daughter were calling out the lies we had time to see, and after hearing me tell
Judge Cornaby it was full of lies, he deprived me my 6th Amendment right to confront
my accusers by not demanding (or even suggesting) such a hearing.

Thus his conspi-

ring to deny me the equal protection of the Lipsev-Casarez-Howell caused me to get
sentenced as a dangerous repeat offender who had another neighborhood victim.
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d) His final act in conspiring to deny me due process 0 f law was. a
criminal one needing investigation by the U.S. Attorney:

he committed outright

perjury in federal court on November 17, 1992 at my habeas hearing of case #9Q-C668-S by stating PSI reports are never available till justLbefore sentencing, whereas
the truth is they are available 3 days ahead of time. He committed additional
perjury when he said my fear of media exposure had caused me to request he allow
evidence against me to be illegally given to the judge in chambers (without me even
knowing its content).
The evidence I will be able to offer the jury is:

(a) the bogus affi-

davit of original charges I refused to sign which I retreived from Vanderlinden!s
office wastebasket;

(b) Judge Cornaby's Sept. 27, 1988 transcribed certificate of

probable cause statement that PSI reports become available 3 days before sentencing, plus the cover page of mine showing such was the case with my report; (c)
eleven handwritten pages of lies I sent Jay Edmonds to use in my appeal which I
discovered only after I was in prison and had time to read the gigantic PSI report,
and the transcript of my sentencing hearing where I told the judge it was full of
lies.

My step-daughter, Margaret Erickson will testify that only she and I, not

Vanderlinden, performed any examination of the report and that as we commented on
the lies we did see, he uttered not one word;

(d) his perjury will be shown in

the transcript of his statements at my November 17, 1992 habeas hearing before
Magistrate Boyce and a July 12, 1988 statement I had prepared to read to Judge
Cornaby about I wanted everything against me presented

in open court. I never

got to go in chambers and present it, however, because, after calling me at work
to rush up to Farmington to "prevent Namba from presenting the Playboys , he went
into chambers without me and thereby let Namba present
sentence recommendation and
listed

secret-from-me maximum

notice of intent to use hearsay at sentencing which

how search warrant evidence showed my criminal mind set.
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Solid evidence of my version of that July 12 fiasco is that Namba
concluded my showing the victim a book called Monster Rallv showed I wanted the
victim to be exposed to aberrations such as devil worship in order to break down
parental relationships. Had I ever seen his documents, I would not have let the
judge

use those same words to sentence me when that book is considered the

classic work by America's best loved cartoonist, Charles Addams. The whole book
came from the pages of the New Yorker.
My ACTUAL INJURY at the hands of Mr. Vanderlinden was 5 years in prison
for which I ask the Court and jury to hold him at least three fifths responsible
for 60 months at $3500—or $126,000.
In the belief that I should be awarded something in the ballpark of S5
million PUNITIVE DAMAGES, I pray that this defendant be held liable for at least
6% of the grand total—or $300,000.
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover which past or present plea
bargain inmates never got to study their possibly damaging PSI reports, and
identify their lawyers.
3) JUDY VALEIKA, AP&P investigator/reporter who works at 99 S. Main
in Farmington, similarly conspired to deny me my 5th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights
to the due process of confronting accusers or examining her other information to
the court by:
a)

telling me the accused are never allowed to examine their PSI

reports. That lie paved the way for her to solicit and report rumors to the judge
and
totally unconfirmed reports there had been another neightborhood victim.
b)

It also enabled her to tell me she had been unable to discover any

underlying cause for

which I could qualify for outpatient treatment (as

recommended by Dr. Roby, I later found out). She consequently told me that, unless
I could come up with another instance of child molestation, she would have to
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report that ray act had been inexcusably willful.
instance.

Accordingly, I invented such an

Judge Cornaby, however, used it to call me a repeat offender and out

me in prison instead of using it to justify the suspended sentence or probation
my age, clean past and crime would warrant.
Thus her conspiracy with the judge and my lawyer prevented my getting
the equal protection of Lipsv-Howell-Casarez case law that I be able to challenge
Illustrative was her fraudulent aggravating circumstance #10 and
her accuracy and fairness.
omission of all mitigating including obvious #9, 10 and 11.
Circumstantial evidence of the above conspiracy and lending solid credence to ijiy version of the events would be to discover if her other clients were
also told they could not see their PSI reports,

(claim a ) - Additionally, calling

as witness the interviewees of my report can be expected to show rumors and exaggerations were actually solicited by telling them I would never get to see what
they said.
b)

My complete AP&P file (not the report) should come in under discovery

to search for any internal notes about how it was a problem that Dr. Roby believed
incarceration was uncalled for.
My ACTUAL INJURY at Ms. Valeika T s hands was 5 years in prison for which
I ask the Court and jury to hold her one tenth responsible—or 6 months at $3500
for a claim of $21,000.

I further pray for a 3% PUNITIVE liability of $150,000.

The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to ask all present and past inmates if
their PSI reporters told them they could not see their reports and if the contents
may have hurt them.
4)

JUDGE DOUGLAS CORNABY, former 2nd District Court judge who now lives

at 3612 N 2900 E, Layton, UT, similarly conspired to deny me equal protection
of Lipsev-Howell-Casarez case law requiring to be based on information checked
for accuracy by defendant when he ridiculed my courtroom claims of PSI report
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lies and false rumors and said I only wanted to confront those accusers so I
could use my domineering abilities and get them to change their stories. This
enabled him to sentence me as a high risk offender with deep-seated sexual problems, using the unseen PSI report lie of another neighborhood victim and my
Valeika-solicited invention of an event 39 years previous.
The transcript of the July 19, 1988 sentencing hearing is the proof I
will be offering the jury. Also a 5/31/88 letter to him about finding rumor sources.
My ACTUAL INJURY was 5 years in prison for which I ask the Court and jury
to hold Judge Cornaby at least three tenths responsible—or 18 months at S3500
for a claim of $63,000. I further pray for a 6% PUNITIVE liability of $300,000.
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover which plea bargain inmates
heard their judge refer to damaging challengeable information without ever being
asked by the judge if they had examined the PSI report.
5)

Appeal attorney JAY EDMONDS who resides at 1660 Orchard Drive in

Salt Lake City participated in the conspiracy to have plea bargainers sentenced
to original charge punishments through the use of false secret information by
refusing to appeal Steve Vanderlinden's causing that to have happened to me. His
guilt, however, would be contingent upon discovering if he has appeared in courtrooms as defense attorney and if he regularly prevented his clients from examining their presentence reports. < H e a l s o refused my written request that
the AG f s response be answered.)
In that event, I would introduce the eleven pages of PSI report lies and
inaccuracies I sent him from prison and ask him to tell the jury if he had any
other explanation why he had decided Vanderlindenrs allowing all this to go to
Judge Cornaby unchallenged,and thus used to deny me a punishment fitting my crime,
was unworthy of being appealed.
My ACTUAL INJURY in this claim can not be calculated by months, so I ask
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for an arbitrary one-year compensatory liability of $42,000. No PUNITIVE.
6)

DAN R. LARSEN, Assistant Attorney General who works at AG headquarters

at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, is heavily involved in the conspiracy to
have plea bargainers get the same punishment as if found guilty by a jury on the
original charges because of his part in the courtroom conspiracy to suspend
prisonersf basic First Amendment right to obtain redress through the absolute
right to use habeas corpus to challenge and correct judges' unconstitutional
actions at sentencing.
a)

He admitted at the dismissal hearing of my Third District Court habeas

petition #900901219 that "there is no relief for Constitutional violations in the
State of Utah".
b)

He next demonstrated how he has been able to bring about this unpre-

cedented suspension when, in my next habeas application #900903466, he conspired
with Judge Sawaya to use UCJA Rule 4-501 to dismiss my petition illegally.
My proof of item (a) will be Carlton Way's transcript of that hearing; and
for (b) it will be the submission of the court's Minute Entry granting Mr. Larsen?s
motion, and reading the rule itself forbidding its use in a habeas corpus.
My ACTUAL INJURY caused by his illegal action and his violating his canon
of ethics to live up to his "duty to uphold legal process [and] in preserving
government under law..." was the resulting 37 months of incarceration at $3500—
or $129,500. I further pray for a 6% PUNITIVE liability of $300,000.
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover how many times this rule has
been so used on Utah prisoners and who the conspirators were.

7) JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP participated in the conspiracy to suspend habeas
corpus by:

(a) admitting he does not allow his court to be used for habeas corpus

review and correction of constitutional violations by fellow judges during their
sentencing hearings, and (b) by saying that an appeal attorney's refusal to appeal
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Vanderlinden's ineffectiveness (maybe because he was very effective for the prosecution?) was no excuse for my not having done so, thus rendering that issue not
eligible for habeas corpus,
I will offer absolute proof of the above when I read from Carlton Way's
transcript of the above proceeding.
My ACTUAL INJURY from the above outrageous supposedly judicial behavior
(it violates Judicial Canon 3 B.(7) mandating my "full right to be heard according
(3/31/90 dismissal—7/28/93 parole)
to law.") was 40 months in prison at $3500—or $140,000. I further pray for a
PUNITIVE liability of 6% of the $5 million dollars—or $300,000.

8)

JUDGE JAMES SAWAYA, as mentioned above in Defendant #6, conspired with

that Asst. AG to illegally use UCJA 4-501 to dismiss my habeas petition. This
denial of my 1st Amendment of access to legal redress for having been punished
without due process not only violated Canon 3 B.(7)(8) of his code of ethics by
denying my right to be heard and unfairly (illegally!) disposing of my judicial
matter, but became criminally punishable

under statute 78-35-1 for wrongful

refusal to allow a habeas corpus.
Need I mention that proof is obviously to be found in his Minute Entry of
dismissal and then reading for the jury UCJA 4-501fs saying it may not be so used?
My ACTUAL INJURY form the above illegal acts was 37 months in prison at
$3500—or $129,500. I further pray for a 5% liability of the PUNITIVE damages
of $5 million

I am suggesting as a just punishment for these constitution-destroy-

ing conspirators—or $250,000. (37 months was from 7/7/90 dismissal to 8/93 parole)
The CLASS ACTION aspect

would be to see which judges did this to

how many prison inmates.
9)

CRAIG LUDWIG, Third District Court Clerk, also acting under color state

law, compromised my 5th Amendment right to due process by not mailing me notifi-
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cation of either of Dan Larsen's two dismissal hearings that took place before
Judge Rigtrup in case # 900901219. Proof will consist of Clerk Ludwig's expected
inability to produce copies of any such notification.
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover how many prisoners in Utah
have thus been hustled up to court without knowing about it ahead of time or what
the action would be about, and upon whose instructions this situation exists.
My ACTUAL INJURY was 40 months in prison after the 3/31/90 dismissal for
which I hold Mr. Ludwig at least 10% responsible for a liability of $14,000. No
PUNITIVE.

10) FEDERAL JUDGE DAVID SAM has undertaken a crucial dual role in the
conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus review of unconstitutional and illegal sentencing thus making him liable for damages under 18 USC 242 as determined by this
Court proceeding under 28 USC 1343 and 1331.
In order to cripple inmates exercising their 1st Amendment right to gain
redress, he dismissed my Bounds v Smith-based 42 USC 1983 civil rights complaint
#92-C-223 of the prison denying prisoners both a law library or contract legal
assistance.

Also endorsed was the prison's denying typewriters and copy machines.

His method of dismissing violated ray 5th Amendment right to due process,
my 1st Amendment right of redress of grievances, and the 14th Amendment's extension of them to all Americans:
a)

First, he violated his own court rules by not allowing the Dept. of

Corrections defendants to even learn they were being sued by never permitting
the summonses to be served.

PROOF will be the jury hearing Clerk Zimmerfs response

that Judge Sam had not allowed him to serve summonses, and FRCP Rule 4(c)(2)
saying that the judge must arrange for such service when the applicant has been
granted in forma pauperis.

0r

the old Rule 4 (c)(2)(B)(i).
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b)

He next ^o^f^iS^withdrew the case from being preliminarily reviewed

and reported on by the magistrate so he could personally enter the case as defense
counsel!

In further denial of due process and equal protection of the rules, he

spent 85 days to frame an answer for the defendants which he used as grounds for
dismissal-

In essence that answer has the effect of repealing the use of 42 USC

1983 civil rights complaints by all citizens of the United States..
\ PROOF of Nii^illegally\bypassing tha magistrate will tf^lettyig the W y
hear Rule

/\f

the Feder^ Rules of Cy<n.l Procedure. A comparison of his

defendant-answer/dismissal-order wording with the actual words of 42 USC 1983
will let a jury determine if I was given equal protection of that law, and how
such actions comport, with his performance of duties as set forth in Canon 3(B)(7)
and (8) of his code of ethics.
c)

His next performance in the conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus was to

accept his magistrate's recommendation for dismissal although it was based on
VanderlindenTs perjury in Boyce's courtroom

and a rejection and a rejection of

obviously truthful testimony of both me and my step-daughter (the AG dared not
cross-examine either one of us).

Magistrate Boyce had no way to know for sure

Vanderlinden was committing perjury although he heard me make that accusation.
However, when I finally saw his Report and Recommendation was based almost
exclusively on the perjuror's testimony, I submitted my official Objections which
contained incontrovertible proof of that perjury.

But Judge Sam decided that

perjury is a perfectly acceptable basis for dismissing a habeas corpus complaint.
This is tantamount to a suspension of habeas corpus and makes Judge Sam
subject to punishment under 28 USC 1331 for depriving me of due process and equal
protection of rules governing federal habeas corpus.
PROOF will have the jury hear Vanderlinden's transcribed statement, then
Judge Cornabyfs transcribed remarks at my 9/27/88 probable cause hearing, plus
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the cover sheet of my PSI report, and my Objections to Boyce's Report and Recommendation—all showing Judge Sam is willing to use perjury to carry out his part
in the conspiracy.
d) The record will show that he believes anyone who objects to being
sentenced on the PSI report's lying about there was another neighborhood victim
is really only complaining about its "form and tenor".
e) The PROOF will further show that my motion to be appointed counsel
in
at my 11/17/92 evidentiary hearing was overruledjfdeliberate direct violation of
28 USC 2254 Rule 8(c).

That rule requires I be appointed counsel whether or not

I request it.
My ACTUAL INJURY from his 4/27/93 dismissal was 3 months in prison at
$3500, plus a 14-month deprivation (from 5/7/92) of prison-supplied legal assistance at an arbitrary $1000—totalling to $24,500, I further pray for an 8%
liability of my suggested $5 million PUNITIVE damages—or $400,000.

11) ANGELA MICKL0S, Assistant AG, participated in the conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus with her Answer to my R&R Objections wherein I had proved the
report was based on perjury.

She said such an objection was no reason not to

adopt the magistrate's report. Any law official not involved in the conspiracy
would have instituted action to bring charges against the perjuror.

Also thus

violated was her responsibility to observe the Rules of Professional Conduct
requiring her to be a force in "preserving government under law [and] to uphold
legal process."
My ACTUAL INJURY for her April 1993 urging the acceptance of perjury was
three months in prison at $3500—or $10,500.
liability of 2%—or $100,000.

I further pray for a PUNITIVE
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12)

GARY DeLAND, former Corrections Director//

present Corrections Director//

13) LANE McCOTTER,

14) ELDON BARNES, former Draper warden//

15)

FRED VAN DER VEUR, Gunnison warden were all crucial participants in the conspiracy
to create A SUSPENSION OF PRISONERS'' Article I Section 9 Constitutional right to
habeas corpus review of being in prison on false secret information.

Their ac-

tions were thus designed to effectively curtail our First Amendment right to seek
redress in the courts by denying us the 14th Amendment's equal protection of the
law as promulgated by the Supreme Court in Bounds v Smith—namely that inmates
must have available research tools as found in a law library, or the services of
a contract attorney.

Such is deemed necessary to file ind then be able to effec-

tively answer the attorney general's motions to dismiss.
a)

To prevent this mandated assistance from becoming available to

inmates, both directors, obviously acting under color of state law, selected the
contract option, but drew it up in such a way as to render it virtually worthless
in inmate habeas actions. That was to have it worded so the contract attorney
is forbidden from offering anything beyond the initial filing, thus guaranteeing
automatic dismissal.
PROOF will consist of letting the jury hear the Legal Assistance described
under Scope of Services in the contract attorneys' agreement with the Department
of Corrections.
b)

The two wardens were enlisted to aid in tnis conspiracy, prooaoly by

the Attorney General. Their assignment was to assure that any "jailhouse lawyer"
work would not be submitted in workmanlike fashion by denying inmates access

to

typewriters or copy machines. At Gunnison, for instance, Van Der Veur decreed
that typewriters would be available for anything other than legal typing, and that
any legal documents needing copying would need a written request to the contract
attorney for him to copy on his next weekly or semi-weekly visit, during which
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wait responses could become overdue.

I believe the illegal habeas-buster UCJA 4-

501 allows only five days.
My PROOF will be to rely initially on the wardens not committing perjury.
Should there be any denials, I will ask for a list of prison employees so those
who implemented the policies can be identified and questioned during discovery.
c)

Mr. Van der Veur even distributed a notice that the contract attorney

would henceforth not be able to even file habeas petitions based on the Foote
decision which mandated the Parole Board hold due process hearings.

Since that

past deprivation was known to be still happening to every parole applicant, the
miniscule contract would need huge augmentation to handle the expected flood.
Evidently Mr. McCotter refused to re-negotiate.
PROOF will be the contract attorney producing the notice itself, and his
request the warden notify the inmates, and the absence of any perjury that the
warden had not- done so.
My ACTUAL INJURIES are $30,000 from Gary DeLand for my first 30 months
of denial of legal assistance at an arbitrary $1000 pr month; #30,000 for a similar
denial from Lane McCotter for my last 30 months;

$500 per month for 28 months

of typewriter denial from Eldon Barnes for a claim of $14,000; and $16,000 for
32 months of typewriter and copy machine denial from Fred Van Der Veur.
PUNITIVE may not be justified because they were probably following the
advice of the attorney General.
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover which inmates were denied,
and by whom, professional help, typewriters and copy machines, to be able to
answer
effectively the AGfs automatic dismissal motions.

16)

PETE HAUN, former Parole Board Chairman//

17) MICHAEL SIBBETT,

former member and present chairman, were crucial contributors in the conspiracy
to have plea bargain inmates serve original-charge punishments. This will be ill-
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ustrated by examining their methods in conducting their parole hearings*
a) After the Supreme Court said in its Foote decision that the Boardfs
hearings would henceforth have to grant equivalent due process to that of a typical
trial/sentencing court because in Utah, the Board, not the court, determines the
actual length of sentences— both of these defendants willfully disregarded the
new requirements by continuing to use secret information against the applicants,
deny them assistance of counsel, refuse to let them confront accusers now heard
for the first time, and not let them call their own witnesses—all in direct violation of the 6th Amendment and its 14th Amendment extension.

These also represent

dramatic deprivals of 5th Amendment protections against getting punished without
having received those due processes.
b)

Accordingly, I was denied parole on the basis of the victim's supposed

"letter of fear" because my letter requesting discovery had been deemed unworthy
of even an acknowledgement, thus preventing me from coming prepared with proof of
her ridiculing such an idea to the PSI investigator.
PROOF will consist of my letter requesting discovery, Sibbett's transcribed
remarks at my 7/31/91 parole hearing, the victim's words as set down in the PSI
report, and a presumed inability on Mr. Haun's part to claim that Sibbect was not
carrying out his policy.
My ACTUAL INJURIES were 24 months of further incarceration from Chairman
Hauny s method of conducting hearings at $3500—or $84,000; and also $84,000 from
Michael Sibbett for the exact same reasons.
I furthermore pray for PUNITIVE damages apportioned at 3% of $5 million—
or $150,000 from Pete Haun;

and 4% from Michael Sibbett—or $200,000.

Th«- CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover every inmate who can determine
he had damaging false secret infromation used against him at his hearing.
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18) LORENZO K. MILLER, Assistant A G, entered the conspiracy to suspend
habeas corpus by:

J- • -i frnffl TnHao T-bbs for the unpreceder.teda) obtaining a dismissal from
Juag. -oos

ia-the-history-of-the United States reason I had named an innocent warden as dedendant.

I was thus denied the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection.;-

i_ • u
,-.-„-. nHsnnpr to name the warden as
of the Utah rules of habeas corpus which require a prisoner to na
b)

He next asked Judge Tibbs to become

a 78-55-1 criminal by moving

that the forbidden UCJA 4-501 be used to dismiss me without a hearing.

Mr. Miller

thereby tried to become an accomplice in the commission of a punishable offenseseemingly a far cry from his Canon of Ethics "duty to uphold legal process".
(That the Attorney General allows assistants to become law violators
is heavy duty evidence how deep this conspiracy is presently embedded in Utah's
court system .)
PROOF will be Miller's "argument" about warden defendants submitted with
no case citations (they did not exist), and 6th District Court records showing his
illegal UCJA 4-501 dismissal submittal.
My ACTUAL INJURY was

23 months of further incarceration at $3500—

or $80,500.
I furthermore pray for PUNITIVE damages of 7% of my suggested $5 million
— o r $350,000.
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to examine district court habeas corpus
records to discover how many times the AG has submitted UCJA 4-501, and which
judges agreed to participate in this violation of lav.

19)

JUDGE DON TIBBS, Sixth District Court, further participated in the

conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus by twice ordering my re-filing refused even
though it now contained the parole board as added defendant as now required for

'
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the first time in U.S. History by Sstes v Van Per Veur.
a)

The first refusal violated my 1st Amendment right of access

courts since the denial was solely based on my
court.

to the

having directed it to "Circuit"

My original petition had been correctly so headed, but just a month pre-

viously Manti had been elevated to district status—but with no notice having
been given to Gunnison inmates. So, instead of just having my heading changed
accordingly, Judge Tibbs ordered it refused with only this cryptic reason: "because their (sic) is no longer a Sixth Circuit Court in Sanpete County..."

No

suggestion was offered of how I might get it into the right court (which was just
where he was sitting when he told his clerk to disgrace the Constitution):
b) He next decided to become an actual law violator by wrongfully refusing a habeas corpus petition (78-35-1) by returning my second re-submittal for
a "failure" to pay a filing fee. Utah statute 21-7-2(2)(c) strictly forbids such
a requirement.
Such willful criminal behavior deprived me of my 14th Amendment right to
equal protection of the law.
PROOF will be the jury hearing the statute read and seeing the two filing
refusals he had the county clerk send me.
My ACTUAL INJURY was 23 months from his 9/16/91 refusal till my July 28,
1993 release on parole at $3500 per month—or $80,000.
I furthermore pray for severe PUNITIVE damages of 9% of my hoped-for $5
million dollar total—or $450,000.

20)

KIRK T0RGENSEN, Assistant A G , was provably

a participant in the

conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus by the manner he resisted my adding another
ground to my federal habeas petition #90-C-668-S.

I felt my Utah habeas being

thrown out for ray following Rule 65B and naming the warden as defendant needed to
be included.

His inability to cite any precedent in history except Estes v Van
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Per Veur 824 P.2d 1200 proves the depths this conspiracy plumbs and reflects his
involvement in denying petitioners equal protection of the law.
Even former judges sitting on the Court of Appeals, had to invent that my
not naming the Parole Board as defendant was the reason Miller and Tibbs used to
correctly dismiss me—because Lorenzo Miller had not even proffered any such
argument!—his argument was only that the warden had not personally deprived me of
any rights.

A next logical step for Mr. Torgensen would be to support a dismissal

because the trial judge was not named as defendant.
PROOF would be the jury hearing Mr. Torgensen attempting to answer this
question: "If the AG's role in upholding the law and seeking justice is to oppose
an apparently legitimate habeas complaint, does it also encompass seeking and/or
defending a dismissal based on the complaint having followed the governing rule
when there was no previous case to use as a precedent?"
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional incarceration can be attributed, but I pray
for a 4% PUNITIVE punishment—or $200,000.
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover how many similar victims he or
other Sixth District judges had so a special prosecutor could bring them to trial.

NOTE:

SHOULD ANY OF THE ABOVE OR FOLLOWING JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS ATTEMPT TO

CLAIM ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, THEY WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME IMBLER V PATCHMAN US 47 L.Ed
128 ON WILLFUL VIOLATIONS UNDER 18 USC 242, SAMUEL V PITT. U 375 F Suppl 119,
WHITE V FLEMING

374 F Suppl 267, AND BAUERS V HEISEL 361 F. 2d 581. OTHERS'

CLAIMS OF IMMUNITY WILL FACE HAFER V MELO 112 S Ct 358 WHICH OVERRIDES ANYTHING TO
THE CONTRARY.
21)

Presiding Judge MICHAEL J. MURPHY, Third District Court, participated

in the conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus by refusing me my 1st Amendment right of
access to his court to seek redress of Judge Rigtruprs stating his court is closed
to habeas complaints about lack of due process

at sentencing—a 78-35-1 crime.
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Instead of allowing the complaint to be filed and receive normal due process procedure, he refused it as a "nuisanse filing" saying my filing it might be
an act punishable by sanctions. That action makes him liable for damages under 18
USC 242 and 28 UCS 1343 for failure under 42 USC 1986 to prevent further conspiratorial violations by a fellow district judge,
PROOF will be his 4/17/92 "sanctions" letter.
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional incarceration can be attributed, but I pray
for a PUNITIVE judgement of 4%—or $200,000.

22)

JOHN WAHLQUIST, Sixth District judge, likewise made himself liable

under 18 USC 242, 28 USC 1343 and 42 USC 1986 when he refused to act to prevent
further 42 USC 1985 conspiratorial acts by Judge Tibbs by:
a)

Instead of scheduling a trial wherein I could exercise my 1st Amendment

right to redress the grievance, he chose to schedule a dismissal hearing "on the
Court's own motion" so certain quite astounding questions could be answered.
b) Then he cancelled that hearing to instead, ask me and the newly-entered
Assistant AG Carlson to submit "briefs" just as if there had been^an answer, a trial,
and a decision that could be appealed.
PROOF of Judge Wahlquist being an invidious moving force to ensure further
violations will be having the jury hear.the wording of his "Court's own motion" and
hear how he tries to answer, explain or elucidate:

(1) what precedent was there for

his making a defense attorney-type motion; (2) why a prisoner's failure to get a
summons served needs a hearing to discover why;

(3) show how 78-35-1 designed to

punish judges could be, or ever has been, used to fine Parole Board members $5000;
and to let the jury hear just which parts of my complaint were "too ambiguous forjudge Tibbs to be able to understand.
Further PROOF will come from the jury hearing why he asked for "briefs^

20.

and why he was able to render a "decision" without JggEEStz receiving one from Mr.
Carlson; and just how the existence of more than one judge in his district as well
as there being more than one county could have an effect on Judge Tibbsr learning
he had been charged with a crime.
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional time served can be attributed, but I pray
for a PUNITIVE judgement of 8%—or $400,000.

23) DAVID CARLSON, Assistant AG, will also be liable under 18 USC 242 and
28 USC 1343 by not only violating 42 USC 1986 by refusing to apply the state's
power to prevent further 42 USC 1985 conspiratorial

acts as well as criminally-

punishable ones by Judge Tibbs, but actually choosing to become his defense attorney.
In defending, rather than prosecuting, criminal law violations, and in
becoming an invidious moving force to ensure further violations, the Office of
Attorney General brands Utah as an outlaw state.
PROOF will hinge on whether Mr. Carlson will be able to explain to the
jury: (a) how a prisoner can, with no law books allowed in the prison library, make
arrangements to serve the summons; (b) how a judge has absolute immunity from a
law designed solely to punish judges;

(c) by what route or precedent has a case

ever proceeded to the Court of Appeals absent :

_ a charge

ever being answered,

or tried from which an appeal could be taken; (d) show his precedent of the Court
of Appeals bringing charges and fining a judge the $5000 of statute 78-35-1; (e)
provide a citation of any appeals court anywhere ever bringing charges (other than
contempt of court) against anybody.
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional time served can be attributed, but I pray
for a stringent PUNITIVE award of 7%—or $350,000.

THE FOLLOWING TWO DEFENDANTS, while clothed in the authority of statederived powers to correct judges' and attorneys' law and ethical violations set

21.
forth above, willfully refused to do so. Instead they conspired to come to the
defense of the practitioners of the conspiracy to suspend habeas review of plea
bargains being nullified so original-charge sentences can be imposed,
THAT DEFENSE CONTAINS AN ADMISSION OF GUILT FOR THEIR "CLIENTS", AND THUS
PROOF OF MY CONSPIRACY CHARGES. IT DID SO BY SAYING SUCH ACTIVITY IS STANDARD
ETHICAL PRACTICE IN UTAH,
These defendants also proved their own active participation in the conspiracy
by going so far as to lie about the content of the laws and rules violated.
In refusing to confront the perpetrators, but accepting instead no-contest
admissions of guilt as a foundation for exoneration, these defendants conspired to
continue as a moving force for further willful violations of Article I Section 9rs
guarantee of habeas corpus, the First Amendment's guarantee of redress of grievances,
and continued Utah violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments' guarantees of due
process.
This conspiracy has caused a nullification of Corpus Juris Secundum,
Sections 145 thru 150 that "Judges are to protect the rights of the individual, not
to conspire to subvert those rights."

24)

DEAN W. SHEFFIELD of the Judicial Conduct Commission, in response to my

complaints of some of the- violations set forth above:
a)

Said Judge Tibbsf clerk must have acted on her own (but presumably never

asked her) when my habeas petition was refused for no filing fee, and then lied by
saying that such petitions jio require the payment of such a fee.
PROOF will be reading the fee rule and his letters to me dated 5/29/92 and
9/16/93.
b) Next, he decided that Judge Sawayafs illegal dismissal using

the forbid-

den UCJA Rule 4-501 was not any problem for his commission.
PROOF will be his 9/16/93 letter Co me and reading the duties of his commission under the laws of Utah for the jury's consideration.

22.

c) He used the same words to dismiss my complaint of Judge Rigtrup's savma
that his court is closed for habeas consideration of Constitutional violations by a
sentencing judge—thus suspending habeas corpus,
PROOF will be the same as in (b) above.
No ACTUAL INJURY for additional time served but I am praying for a PUNITIVE
award of 6%—or $300,000.

25)
a)

P. GARY FERRER0 of the Utah State Bar participated in the conspiracy by:
Responding that Dan Larsenfs and Lorenzo Miller's illegal submittals of

UCJA Rule 4-501, and that LarsenTs tacit admission that he is a part of Utah's suspension of habeas corpus—neither one constituting any evidence of an ethical violation.
b)

He furthermore justified the use of the rule to dismiss habeas petitions

for it being an "adopted court rule". He thus supplied conclusive proof of the statewide conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus review of using secret information to illegally sentence plea bargainers to original-charge terms because Webster defines
ethical as "conforming to accepted standards of professional conduct."
PROOF will be my complaint letter of Feb.11, 1993, Mr. Ferrerd1s responses of
5/3/93 and 6/22/93, plus the jury hearing a reading of Rule 4-501.
c) Mr. Ferrero additionally conspired to endorse Assistant AG Carlson's
intervening as defense attorney, rather than prosecutor, to proffer the unbelievable
claim that Judge Tibbs, being a judge, has absolute immunity from a law solely enacted
to punish judges.
PROOF will again be ray cpmplaint letter and the response to it which I don't
seem to be able to locate. That should not be a problem.
I claim no ACTUAL INJURY, but pray for a substantial PUNITIVE award of 6%
of my suggested $5 million total--or $300,000.

23.

In view of the reality of this statewide conspiracy to support and defend,
rather than prosecute, crimes by public officials, I will only state for the record
that both former governor, NORMAN BANGERTER, and present governor, MICHAEL LEAVITT,
were both given a full apprisal of the foregoing defense counsel/ AG / judge
unconstitutional behavior. Both chose, however, to become integral moving forces
in the conspiracy by not even acknowledging receipt of the information—let alone
initiating any action to curb further violations. Maybe issue a joinder??

BASIS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES AND PUNISHMENT: By reason of the conduct of
the defendants, or as part of their governmental entity's participation in the conspiracy to void plea bargains so original-charge punishments can be imposed without the expense of trials, each one became separately liable the months in prison
his or her unconstitutional acts caused.

In so doing, they deprived me of one, or

more, or all of the following rights, privileges and immunities secured to me by
the Constitution of the United States:
a

t
Section 9.

The right to have habeas corpus procedure open to me under Article I

b. The right to petition the courts for redress of grievances under the
First Amendment.
c. The right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law
under the Fifth Amendment.
d. The right in all liberty-interest proceedings to be informed of the
nature of the accusations; to confront witnesses against me; to have my own witnesses; and to have assistance of counsel—all under the Sixth Amendment.

The basis of my claims for actual injury is $2500 per month compensating
for loss of salary, plus $1000 per month nominal for the mental suffering and
anguish for being in prison instead of outside on probation, or from a habeasordered re-sentencing, or a new parole hearing.

I have put forth amounts based

24.

on the comparative negligence or illegal acts of each defendant.
Furthermore, the acts, conduct and behavior of the defendants were performed knowingly, intentionally and maliciously which entitles me to an award of
punitive damages.

I have suggested the amount of 5 million dollars to be

assessed

according to the apparent willful misconduct and to the resulting damage to me or
justice under law.

Whatever the final amount of all damages awarded, I hereby pledge all
monies over $750,000 to create a class action remedy fund to get relief for the
hundreds, or thousands of past and present inmates who were incarcerated and/or
denied parole because of false unchallenged secret information; and for all who
were denied habeas corpus hearings through illegal or unconstitutional court procedure; or were unable to pursue such actions because of the absence of prison law
libraries or crippling restrictions deliberately imposed on contract attorneys.

On the off-chance the perpetrators try to avoid responsibility for their
illegal/unethical conspiratorial acts with an answer of mootness, lack of standing
behind
or statute of limitations because I am no longer,ibars, I now reply with the preemptive fact that my "freedom" can be ended without even the benefit of a hearing
should I be seen drinking beer, or visiting my adoring grandkids without a parent
present, cook with wine, or go hiking on Wheeler Peak ,Nev. etc., etc.
And the decision would rest with defendant Michael Sibbett.
Furthermore, I ask this Court for acknowlegement of Utah precept as set
forth in Jensen v. DeLand Ut S. Ct. 870107 and Martinez v. Smith 602 P.2d 700/702
that

"to dismiss should be regarded as admission of allegations to be true.

Judge should

not

cater to prosecution [here as defendants] whim but proceed to

determine the facts."

25.

Preliminary to my listing of my previous related court actions and mv
prayer for relief, I now quote Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. For
five years I have been deprived of this fundamental guarantee of a civilized way
to redress wrongs by the very public servants who have sworn to uphold the efficacy and regular adherence to its provisions:
Courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall
be administered without denial or unneccessary delay."

PREVIOUS RELATED LAWSUITS
If any defendant challenges the existence of conspiracy, he need first
proffer a logical explanation how the following actions were, in five years,
unable to bring about their one purpose: a hearing where I would be allowed to
show ineffectiveness of counsel had Judge Cornaby sentence me as a dangerous
repeat offender from deliberate PSI report lies I never got to expose; or one
where I could challenge similar unconstitutional Parole Board actions.
Absent such explanations for this unprecedented list, defenses should
accordingly be regarded as mere technical evasions in keeping with the foregoing
illegal and/or unconstitutional actions made to avoid uncovering the root purpose
of nullifying plea bargains to get original-charge punishments without the cost
of trials or habeas corpus exposure of that conspiracy:
ACTION

COURT

CASE #

DATE

PARTIES

f
j
JUDGE
_Jl

j OUTCOME

Mot.for Stray Execut.

2nd Dist.

5983

j Denied
Cor
7/28/88 Utah v. Estes [Cornaby

Cert. Probable Cause

Ut. Su. Ct.

880279

8/1/88

Denied

Utah v. Estes
J

i

Mot. Withdr. Plea

2nd Dist.

5983

! 12/14/85 Utah v. Estes

Cor
Cornabv
j Denied
i

26.

Writ Habeas Corpus

IT Sup. Ct.

Cert. Probable Cause

Esces v. Warcei

2nd Dist.

880279
880329
5983

9/20/88 Utah v. Estes

New Cert. Prob. Caus

OT Sup. Ct.

880279

12/31/88Utah v. Estes

Denied

Appeal Trial (senten

4/17/89 Utah v. Estes

Confirmed

Certiorari

UT Sup. Ct. 880279
Ct.of Appls
890272
UT Sup. Ct. 890271

1/3/90 Utah v. Estes

Denied

Writ Habeas Corpus

3rd District 900901219

1/29/90 Estes v Warden Rigtrup

Dismissed

Appeal Dismissal

UT Sup. Ct.

4/7/90 Estes v Warden

Confirmed

Second Habeas Corpus

3rd District 900903466

6/2/90 Estes v Warden Sawaya

Dismissed z

7/27/90 Estes v Warden

UCJA 4-5C
Denied

Enforce Right to HC
Hearing

UT Sup. Ct.

90015

?7

Appeal H.C. DismissaJJ Ct. of Appl, 900418

9/8/88

4/1/91

Cornabv

Estes v Warden

Dismissed
Denied

Confirmed

Certiorari

UT Sup. Ct.

900418

10/24/91IEstes v Warden

Denied

28 USC 2254 H.C.

U.S. Dist.

90-C-0668

9/10/90 Estes v Wardeni Sam

Dismissed :
non-exhaus

Appeal 2254 Dismissal) U.S. 10th
Circuit

91-4091 i 4/1/91 [Estes v Warden*
1
!*

Confirmed

Writ Habeas Corpus

U.S. Supr Ct] 92-5034

10/15/92 Estes v Warden)
Van Der Veur

28 USC 2254 remanded
after exhaustion
Appeal of 2254 Dism.

U.S. Distr.

2/12/92

Estes v Warden! Sam

Dismissed

U.S. 10th Crl 93-4086

5/?/93

Estes v Warden!

Confirmed

42 USC 1983

U.S. Distr.

2/2/92

Estes v Deot. I Sam
Corrections

Dismissed

Appeal of 1983 Disml

US 10th Circl 92-4087

6/5/92

ditto

Confirmed

Certiorari

US Supr. Ct

92-6557

11/10/92

ditto

Denied

Petition to Re-hear

US Supr. Ct

92-6557

1/25/93

ditto

Denied

Writ Habeas Corpus

6th Discrictj 9947

90-C-668

92-C-223

8/5/91

Estesv Warden] Tibbs
Van Der veur

Denied

Dismissed

27.

ditto

Confirmed

ditto

Denied

Appeal of H.C. Disml

UT S Ct/App

910613-CA 9/30/91

Certiorari

UT Supr Ct.

92103

Re-subm w/added def
Habeas Corpus

6th District! 920600157 1/31/92

Appeal of H.C. Disml

Appeals Crt

930083-CA 2/4/93

ditto

Confirmed

Certiorari

UT Supr Ct

930348

3/3/92

ditto

Mooted (pa:

78-35-1 Complaint

6th District} 920600148 3/23/92 Estes v Tibbs
6/7/92 f

2/3/92

Estes v Van Dejr.
Vuer & Bd Pardj Mower

Dismissed

Wahlauist Dismissed

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Therefore, I, the plaintiff, Newton C. Estes, pray

that the defendants

each be cited to answer this complaint, and that plaintiff have judgement for
the actual damages I have set forth above, and for the further sum of $5,000,000
exemplary punitive damages from eighteen or more of them on account of their
malfeasance or malice, and the costs of this civil rights suit and other general
and equitable relief. Or as otherwise decided by the jury.

ti.

Respectfully submitted on thi13 12 _day of July, 1994.

Newton C. Estes
The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that the information
contained herein is true and correct-

(As to be proved by the record of the above.

30 court actions)

Tl^^Crv- C r-it^
Newton C. Estes

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING:

I hereby certify that, in accordance with Magistrate

28.

Alba's advice on how to proceed, I mailed a copv of this Amended Civil Rights
Complaint on -this / a day of July, 1994 to these Defendants who were previously
served a copy with summons requiring an answer in 20 days, or mailed a Waiver
of Service for Summons request requiring an answer within 60 days of that June
20 mailing.

Presumably receipt of all answers now become due 20 days after this

mailing plus 3 days for delivery to defendant, plus another 3 days for delivery
to me and the Court from defendant: (1) Brian Namba, Deputy Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618, Farmington, UT 84025;
dian), 2218 N

(2) Steve Vanderlinden, C/0 Dennis Day (guar-

1300 W, Clinton, UT 84015;

(3) Judy Valeika, Adult Probation &

Parole, P.O. Box 700, Farmington, UT 84025;
2900 E, Layton, UT 84040;
84106;

(4) Judge Douglas Cornaby, 3612 N

(5) Jay Edmonds, 1660 Orchard Drive, Salt Lake City, UT

(6) Dan R. Larsen, Asst. Utah Attorney General, 330 S

City UT 84111;

300 E, Salt Lake

(7) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Court, 240 E

Salt Lake City UT 84111;

(8) Judge James Sawaya, 683 E

4800 S, Murray, UT 84107;

(9) Craig Ludwig, Clerk of the Court, Third Distrcit Court, 240 E
Lake City UT 84111;

(11) Angela Micklos, Asst. Utah Attorney

General, 124 State Capitol, Salt Lake City UT 84114;
579, Santa Clara, UT 84765;

(14) Eldon Barnes, 986 Granite Peak Drive,

(15) Warden Fred Van Der Veur, Central Utah Correctional Faci-

lity, Gunnison, UT 84634;

(16) Pete Haun, c/o Utah Board of Pardons, 448 East

6400 South #300, Murray, UT 84107;
Pardons, 448 E

(12) Gary De Land, P.O.Box

(13) Lane McCotter, c/o Utah Dept. of Corrections,

300 E, #400, Murray, UT 84107;

Sandy, UT 84094;

400 S, Salt

(10) Judge David Sam, United States District Court, 350 South

Main St., Salt Lake City UT 84101;

6100 S

400 S,

(17) Michael Sibbett, c/o Utah Board of

6400 S #300, Murray, UT 84107;

Utah Attorney General, 330 S

(18) Lorenzo K. Miller, Asst.

300 E, Salt Lake City, UT 84111;

(19) Judge Don

Tibbs, Sixth District Court, 160 North Main Street, Manci, UT 84642;

(20) Kirk

29.

M. Torgensen, Asst. Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,
UT 84114;

(21) Judge Michael Murphy, Third District Court, 240 E

Lake City, UT 84111;

(22) Judge John Wahlquist, 25 Amistad, Irvine, CA 92720;

(23) David M. Carlson, Asst. Utah Attorney General, 330 S
UT 84111;

300 E, Salt Lake City,

(24) Dean W. Sheffield, c/o Judicial Conduct Commission, 3760 High-

land Drive, #246, Salt Lake City, UT 84106;
Bar, 645 S

400 S, Salt

(25) P. Gary Ferrero, c/o Utah State

200 E, #205, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.

Newton C. Estes
372 E

700 N

Kaysville, UT
Phone:

84037

801/544-5253

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE"DISTRICT OF UTAH
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NEWTON C. ESTES,
Plaintiff,

1

Case No.

94-NC-089 W

BRIAN NAMBA, et al. ,

]1

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

vs.

Defendants.

]

Plaintiff, Newton C. Estes, commenced this action on June
17, 1994, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, claiming
constitutional violations arising out of an alleged conspiracy
among the twenty-five named defendants "to nullify plea bargains
by suspending habeas corpus review of courtroom victims receiving
original-charge punishments through the use of false secret
information by the sentencing judge and parole board."

(Compl.

at 2, File Entry #1; Am. Compl. at 2, File Entry # 3 0.)
The individuals named in the plaintiffs complaint include
the following non-state employees as defendants:

Brian Namba,

Davis County Prosecutor; Steve Vanderlinden, defense attorney and
public defender; Jay Edmonds, attorney; Dean Sheffield, Judicial

Conduct Commission; Gary Ferraro, Utah State Bar; and United
States District Court Judge David Sam.

Additionally, the

following individuals employed by the State of Utah (collectively
referred to as the "state defendants") were named:

Judy Valeika,

Adult Probation and Parole investigator; The Honorable Douglas
Cornaby; Dan Larsen, Assistant Attorney General; The Honorable
Kenneth Rigtrup; The Honorable James Sawava; Craig Ludwig, Third
District Court Clerk; Angela Micklos, Assistant Attorney General;
Gary DeLand, former director of Department of Corrections; 0.
Lane McCotter, director of Department of Corrections; Eldon
Barnes, former warden at Utah State Prison; Fred Vanderveur,
warden at Gunnison Correctional Facility; Pete Haun, former
chairman of Parole Board; Michael Sibbett, chairman of Parole
Board; Lorenzo Miller, Assistant Attorney General; The Honorable
Don Tibbs; Kirk Torgensen-,-Assistant Attorney General; The
Honorable Michael Murphy; The Honorable John Walhquist; and David
Carlson, Assistant Attorney General.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The case was assigned to United States District Judge David
K. Winder, who subsequently referred the matter to the magistrate

n

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (B) . The case was then
assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba.
On June 24, 1994, the magistrate judge ordered the plaintiff
to file an amended complaint, due to the fact that the vague and
conclusory allegations contained in the original complaint failed
to state a claim.

(File Entry #24.)

amended complaint on July 18, 1994.

The plaintiff filed his
(File Entry #30.)

Motions to Dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6), were filed by or on behalf
of all of the defendants (except Steve Vanderlinden1) , along with
supporting memoranda.

(File Entries #33-Edmonds, #35-Sheffield,

#37-Namba, #42-Ferraro, #45-all state defendants, and #58-Sam.)

l

A motion to quash attempted service of process on Mr.
Vanderlinden was filed by Michael Nielsen, by special appearance,
on July 8, 1994. (File Entry #28.) The magistrate judge granted
the motion on August 1, 1994, finding that due to defendant
Vanderlinden's present incapacity, plaintiff had not complied
with the service requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(g)
and Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(3). (File Entry #32.) Plaintiff again
attempted service of process on Mr. Vanderlinden through Mr.
Nielsen. (File Entry #40.) Mr. Nielsen subsequently advised the
court that he is unable to accept service of process because he
is not the guardian or conservator of Mr. Vanderlinden. (File
Entry #52.) At the hearing on the other defendants' motions to
dismiss, plaintiff agreed to withdraw his claims against Mr.
Vanderlinden. Accordingly, this Court recommends that all claims
against Mr. Vanderlinden be dismissed with prejudice.
3

The plaintiff filed responses to the defendants' motions (File
Entries #48-51, 56 and 60), to which the defendants replied (File
Entries #54-Edmonds, #55-Ferraro, #65-state defendants, and #67Sam) . Additionally, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Not Allow
Atterney [sic] General to Engage in Federal Courtroom
Racketeering by Representing Judicial Defendants; and
Disqualification from Representing other Defendants."
Entry #44.)

(File

The state defendants filed a memorandum in

opposition to the plaintiff's motion.

(File Entry ^6G.)

At the

hearing on the motions to dismiss, the plaintiff withdrew the
above motion.

(File Entry #69.)

A hearing on the defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's
amended complaint was held before the magistrate judge on
September 19, 1994. The Court heard oral arguments from the
plaintiff, pro se; Gerald Hess, for defendant Namba; Jay Edmonds,
pro se; Stephen Sorenson, Assistant United States Attorney, for
defendant Judge Sam; Carman Kipp and Kirk Gibbs, for defendant
Ferrero; Dean Sheffield, pro se; and Mark Shurtleff, Assistant
Attorney General, for the state defendants.

Plaintiff orally

requested leave to file a second amended complaint, which the

4

Court denied.

Additionally, the plaintiff was notified that the

Court will recommend that sanctions be imposed on the plaintiff,
under Fed. R. Civ. P. n , should the plaintiff seek to amend his
complaint in the future without remedying the pleading
deficiencies as to the conspiracy claim.
After a thorough review of all pleadings and consideration
of the oral arguments presented at the hearing on the motions to
dismiss, the Court issues the following Report and
Recommendation.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff's alleged web of conspiracy begins when he was
arraigned on a criminal matter in Utah State Court in January of
1988.

Plaintiff describes the ''conspiracy" as follows:
a conspiracy to nullify plea bargains by
suspending habeas corpus review of courtroom
victims receiving original-charge punishments
through the use of false secret information
by the sentencing judge and parole board.
The purpose is to achieve the same result
without the cost of a trial.

:

The facts set forth below are based solely on the
allegations made in the plaintiff's amended complaint, and are
presumed to be true only for purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion.
5

(Am. Compl. at l.)3
Defendant Namba was the prosecuting attorney at the
arraignment.

(Am. Compl. at 2.)

Plaintiff alleges that he asked

Namba to recommend an attorney and was given defendant Steve
Vanderlinden7s name.

(Id.)

Defendant Vanderlinden represented

plaintiff in the criminal matter.

(Am. Compl. at 3.)

At some point in either June or July of 1988, plaintiff pled
guilty in the criminal action.

Plaintiff alleges that, in

connection with his guilty plea, Vanderlinden tried to get him to
sign an affidavit dated June 21, 1988, that contained admissions
concerning the original criminal charges brought against the
plaintiff.

(Am. Comp. at 3.)

Plaintiff attributes authorship of

this affidavit to defendant Namba.

(Am. Compl. at 2.)

In connection with the plaintiff's sentencing in July of
1988, plaintiff claims that Vanderlinden did not obtain
plaintiff's presentence report until 20 minutes before the
2

The plaintiff spins each of the named defendants into the
alleged web of conspiracy by attributing their involvement in che
proceedings subsequent to the plaintiff's plea bargain and
sentencing in July of 1988, as somehow connected with the
conspiracy. This is accomplished by making broad and conclusory
allegations that a particular defendant's actions, in some
unspecified way, manifest involvement in a conspiracy against the
plaintiff.
6

sentencing hearing.

(Am. Comp. at 3.)

Plaintiff further alleges

that the presentence report was very lengthy and filled with
lies.

According to the plaintiff, Vanderlinden did not review

the report nor did he challenge the contents at the hearing.

As

a result plaintiff alleges that he was sentenced as a "dangerous
repeat offender."

(Am. Compl. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff also claims that Vanderlinden perjured himself at
a hearing on November 17, 1992, before United States Magistrate
Judge Ronald Boyce, concerning plaintiff's federal habeas
petition.

Plaintiff alleges that Vanderlinden testified that the

presentence reports are not available to defendants until just
before sentencing.

(Am. Compl. at 4. ) Additionally, plaintiff

claims that Vanderlinden allowed Namba to present negative
evidence against plaintiff to the sentencing judge outside of the
plaintiff's presence.

(Am. Compl. at 4-5.)

Defendant Judy Valeika was the Adult Probation and Parole
investigator tasked with preparing plaintiff's presentence
report.

Plaintiff alleges that the report contained lies and

unconfirmed rumors.

(Am. Compl. at 5-6.)

Plaintiff also claims

that Valeika told him that he was not allowed to see his

7

presentence report.

(Am. Compl. at 5.)

Judge Douglas Cornaby, of the Second District Court for the
State of Utah, sentenced the plaintiff in the underlying criminal
matter.

Plaintiff alleges that Judge Cornaby sentenced him as a

"high risk offender with deep-seated sexual problems/' despite
plaintiff's professions that the presentence report contained
lies and false rumors.

(Am. Compl. at 6-7.)

Judge Cornaby also

denied plaintiff's motion to withdraw his plea.

(Am. Compl. at

25.)
Defendant Jay Edmonds handled plaintiff's appeal.
Compl. at 7.)

(Am.

Plaintiff claims that Edmonds failed to raise

Vanderlinden's ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for
appeal.

(Am. Compl. at 7.)

Defendant Dan Larsen, Assistant Attorney General,
represented the state's interest in connection with two of
plaintiff's habeas corpus petitions (#900901219 and #900903466).
(Am. Compl. at 8.)

The first petition was dismissed by Judge

Kenneth Rigtrup, of the Third District Court for the State of
Utah, (Am. Compl. at 8-9, 26), while the second one was dismissed
by Third District Court Judge James Sawaya, pursuant to "UCJA 4-
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501."

(Am. Compl. at 9, 26.)
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Craig Ludwig, Clerk for the

Third District Court, State of Utah, failed to mail notification
to the plaintiff of the "two dismissal hearings" that took place
before Judge Rigtrup in case #900901219.

(Am. Compl. at 10.)

At some point during 1990, plaintiff filed a 28 U.S.C. §
2254 petition (90-C-0668) in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah.

The case was assigned to United States

District Court Judge David Sam, who dismissed the petition upon
the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge
Ronald Boyce.

(Am. Compl. at 11-12, 26.)

Plaintiff alleges that

the dismissal was primarily based on the uperjur[ed]" testimony
of Vanderlinden and that in his objection to the Report and
Recommendation, he provided Judge Sam with proof of the perjury.
(Am. Compl. at 11-12.)

Plaintiff also alleges that -de-f endant

Angela Micklos, Assistant Attorney General, filed an answer to
plaintiff's objection to the Report and Recommendation urging the
court to adopt it.

Plaintiff claims that Micklos violated the

Rules of Professional Conduct in failing to institute proceedings
against Mr. Vanderlinden, the alleged perjuror.
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(Am. Compl. at

12.)

Plaintiff complains that Kirk Torgensen, Assistant Attorney

General, participated in the Conspiracy" when he "resisted" the
plaintiff's attempt to add another ground to his petition.

(Am.

Compl. at 17-18.)
In 1992, plaintiff filed a second action in the United
States District Cburt pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (92-C-223) ,
alleging constitutional violations concerning his access to legal
materials or contract attorneys, and denial of a typewriter and
copy machine.

The case was again assigned to Judge Sam and

subsequently dismissed prior to service of process on the named
defendants.

(Am. Compl. at 10-11, 26.)

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Gary DeLand, Lane
McCotter, Eldon Barnes and Fred Van Der Veur, all associated with
the Department of Corrections, participated in the alleged
conspiracy to suspend prisoners' habeas corpus review by
selecting the "contract attorney option" for providing legal
services to inmates and by denying inmates access
or copy machines.

to typewriters

(Am. Compl. at 13-14.)

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Pete Haun and Michael
Sibbett, parole board members, violated plaintiff's

10

constitutional rights during his parole hearing when they denied
him parole.

Plaintiff alleges that Haun and Sibbett used "secret

information" against him, denied him assistance of counsel,
refused to let plaintiff confront his accusers, and did not let
plaintiff call his own witnesses.

(Am. Compl• at 15.)

Defendant Lorenzo Miller, Assistant Attorney General,
represented the state in connection with another habeas corpus
petition filed (#9947).

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Miller

obtained a dismissal of the petition from Sixth District Court
Judge Don Tibbs on the basis that he had "named an innocent
warden" and pursuant to "UCJA 4-501."

(Am. Compl. at 16.)

Plaintiff also complains that Judge Tibbs wrongfully refused the
refiling of plaintiff's petition on the grounds that it was
directed to the wrong court and plaintiff failed to pay a filing
fee.

(Am. Compl. at 17.)
Plaintiff claims that defendant Third District Court Judge

Michael Murphy participated in the "conspiracy" when he refused
the filing of a civil complaint by plaintiff in Utah state court
against Judge Rigtrup, characterizing it as a "nuisance filing"
and threatening sanctions.

(Am. Compl. at 19.)

11

Plaintiff

alleges similar actions by defendant Sixth District Court Judge
John Wahlquist when he refused to act to prevent "further
conspiratorial acts by Judge Tibbs."

(Am. Compl. at 19-20.)

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant David Carlson, Assistant
Atorney General, participated in the "conspiracy" when he chose
to defend Judge Tibbs, instead of prosecuting him.

(Am. Compl.

at 20.)
Defendant Dean Sheffield's alleged connection to the
"conspiracy" stems from his role on the Judicial Conduct
Commission, where he refused to discipline Judges Tibbs, Sawaya
and Rigtrup for their actions.

(Am. Compl. at 21-22.

Defendant Gary Ferrero, of the Utah State Bar, is allegedly
connected to the "conspiracy" as a result of his failure to
censure Assistant Attorneys General Larsen and Miller for their
actions concerning his various habeas corpus petitions, and
Assistant Attorney General Carlson for his role as defense
attorney for Judge Tibbs.

(Am. Compl. at 22.)

Following the plaintiff's guilty plea and sentencing for the
underlying criminal action, plaintiff filed an appeal.
Plaintiff's conviction was affirmed on or about April 17, 1989.
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(Am. Comp. at 25-25.) During the period of 1990 through 1992,
plaintiff filed three habeas corpus petitions in Utah State Court
(#900901219, #900903466, and #9947, resubmitted as #920600157).
All of these petitions were dismissed.

Plaintiff exercised his

right to appeal, and the dismissals were affirmed.
at 26-27.)

(Am. Compl.

In 1990 and Plaintiff filed a habeas corpus petition,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, which was subsequently dismissed and
affirmed upon appeal to the Tenth Circuit.

(Am. Compl. at 26.)

In 1992, plaintiff filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, which was subsequently dismissed and affirmed
upon appeal to the Tenth Circuit.

(Am. Comp. at 26.)

In 1992,

plaintiff filed a complaint against Judge Tibbs in the Sixth
District Court for the State of Utah, which was dismissed.
Compl. at 27.)

STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides a mechanism for dismissal of a complaint where the
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(Am.

plaintiff fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."

In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, a court

"presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and
construes them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff."
E,g, , Hall v. Bellmon. 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991).
Where a complaint has been filed by a pro se litigant, the court
should construe the complaint liberally and hold it to a "less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."
IsL. at 1110 (citing Haines v. Kerner. 404 U.S. 519, 520-21
(1972)) . The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this rule to mean
that if "the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a
valid claim on which the plaintiff could pre\rail, it should do so
despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority,
his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and
sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading
requirements."

Id.

In requiring a broad reading of a pro se plaintiff's
complaint, however, the plaintiff is not relieved of the burden
of alleging "sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim
could be based."

Id.

"[C]onclusory allegations without
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supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on
which relief can be based."

Id. (citing Dunn v. White. 880 F.2d

1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), ££TJL. denied. 493 U.S. 1059, 110
S.Ct. 871 (1990); Sooner Products Cn

v. MrBride. 708 F.2d 510,

512 (10th Cir. 1983); Clulnw v. Oklahoma. 700 F.2d 1291, 1303
(10th Cir. 1983) , overruled, o_Q other grounds sub. nam, Garcia v,
Wilson. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir: 1984), aff'd. 471 U.S. 261
(1985) ,- Lorraine v. United States. 444 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir.
1971)) .

"Moreover, in analyzing the sufficiency of the

plaintiff's complaint, the court need accept as true only the
plaintiff's well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory
allegations."

Hall. 935 F.2d at 1110 (citing Dunn. 880 F.2d at

1190) .
DISCUSSION
The defendants raise numerous grounds in arguing that
plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Defendants first argue that since

plaintiff's § 1983 claim is grounded on the alleged illegality
surrounding plaintiff's criminal conviction and sentence, the
recent Supreme Court case of Heck v. Humphrey. 114 S.Ct. 2264
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(1994), bars such a claim absent a showing that the plaintiff's
conviction or sentence

was invalidated.

Defendants next attack

the sufficiency of the facts alleged in connection with the
plaintiff's §§ 1985 and 1986 claims, arguing that the plaintiff
failed to allege a prima facie case of discrimination or
conspiracy.

Additional bases for dismissal relied upon by the

defendants include absolute and qualified or "good faith"
immunity.

Defendant Edmonds argues that his status as

plaintiff's appeals attorney does not make him a "state actor"
for purposes of § 1983 liability.

Finally, several of the

defendants raise statute of limitations, service of process and
Eleventh Amendment issues in support of dismissal.
I.

Cognizability of 5 1983 Claim Based on Illegality of
Plaintiff's Conviction. Sentence or Incarceration.
The defendants urge the court to dismiss the plaintiff's

§1983 claim based on the recent Supreme Court ruling in Heck v.
Humphrey. 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994).

In Heck, the Court considered

the cognizability of a § 1983 claim seeking damages for an
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.
Recognizing the need for finality and consistency in criminal
proceedings, the Court held that;
16

in order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, [footnote omitted] a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid
by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for
damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983,
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in
a § 1983 suit, the district court must
consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Id. at 2372 (emphasis supplied).
In the case at hand, the basis of plaintiff's § 1983 claim
centers on the plea bargain and sentencing aspect of plaintiff's
underlying criminal conviction, alleging a widespread conspiracy
among the numerous defendants.

Unquestionably, a judgment in

favor of plaintiff's § 1983 claim would necessarily imply that
plaintiff's sentence was invalid.

Under the precedent

established in Heck, the plaintiff does not have a cognizable
17

action under § 1983 unless he can show that his sentence has
already been invalidated.

Based on a review of the plaintiff's

complaint, it is clear that despite the numerous attempts to
collaterally attack his state court sentence, the plaintiff's
sentence has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order or declared invalid.

Thus, the plaintiff does

not have a cognizable action under § 1983 and this claim should
be dismissed.
II.

Heck. 114 S.Ct. at 2372.

Sufficiency of the Allegations Under 42 U.S.C. 55 1985 and

There are three subsections to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which
provide remedies for injuries or deprivation arising out of a
conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.

Subsections (1) and

(2) are not applicable to the facts alleged by the plaintiff.4
The remaining subsection (3) appears to be most closely related
4

Subsection (1) of § 1985 provides a cause of action where
an alleged conspiracy has prevented a person from taking federal
office or prevented a federal official from discharging his or
her official duties. The plaintiff in the instant case is a
private citizen and has not made any allegations that he has been
prevented from taking a federal office. Subsection (2) concerns
the intimidation of participants in federal court from testifying
in court or injury to such participants for having so testified.
Plaintiff has not alleged any acts of intimidation or injury in
connection with testimony at a federal court proceeding. Thus,
plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1985(1) or (2).
18

to the allegations set forth in the plaintiff's complaint.
Section 1985(3) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . .
for the purpose of depriving . . . any person
. . . of the equal protection of the laws, or
of equal privileges and immunities under the
laws; . . . [or] cause to be done, any act in
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy
. . . the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of
damages....
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994).
In order to state a cause of action under § 1985(3), the
plaintiff must allege four essential elements: M l ) a conspiracy;
(2) to deprive plaintiff of equal protection or equal privileges
and immunities; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and
(4) an injury or deprivation resulting therefrom."

Tilton v.

Richardson. 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (citingflriffinv.
Breckinridge. 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971)), cert, denied, 114
S.Ct. 925 (1994); Seamons v. Snow. 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1123 (D.
Utah 1994) ; Taylor v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 661 F. Supp.
1341, 1345 (N.D.Tex. 1986) . Defendants argue that the
plaintiff's complaint fails to sufficiently allege the foregoing
essential elements and, therefore, fails to state a claim under
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§1985.

This Court agrees. A broad reading of the allegations

contained in the plaintiff's amended complaint reveals that it is
deficient, in several respects, and does not support of a cause
of action under § 1985.
First, it is clearly established that broad, conclusory
allegations of a conspiracy to violate civil rights are
insufficient to support such a claim.

Taylor, 661 F. Supp. at

1345; Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University. 625 F.
Supp. 1288, 1297 (D.Del. 1985), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 966
(1989) . Rather, a plaintiff must plead specific, admissible
facts "supporting an inference that Defendants reached a 'meeting
of the minds.'" Seamcns. 864 F. Supp. at 1123; see Qallegos v.

City and County of Denver, 984 F.2d 358, 364 doth cir. 1993),
Cert, denied. 113 S.Ct. 2962 (1993); Tavlor. 661 F. Supp. at
1345; Margin. 625 F. Supp. at 1297.

It is not enough to show

merely that the defendants had a common goal or acted in concert.
Martin. 625 F. Supp. at 1297.

In the instant case, the plaintiff

makes broad and conclusory allegations of a wide-spread
conspiracy among the named defendants, yet provides no specific
or admissible facts identifying how the defendants came to an
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agreement to act in concert to deprive the plaintiff of his
constitutional rights.
Another significant pleading deficiency relating to
plaintiff's § 1985 claim concerns the second element set forth
above, which requires that the plaintiff show that the conspiracy
was formed for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of "equal
protection or equal privileges and immunities."
at 686.

Tilton, 6 F.3d

Focusing on the "equal protection or equal privileges

and immunities" language contained in § 1985(3), the Supreme
Court in Griffen v. Breckenridge. 403 U.S. at 101-102, held that
§1985(3) does not "apply to all tortious, conspiratorial
interferences with the rights of others," but rather, only to
conspiracies motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."

Id.: Bisbee v,

Bey. 39 F.3d 1096, 1102 (10th Cir. 1994); Tilton. 6 F.3d-at 686;
Silkwood v. Kerr-Mrflee Corp.. 637 F.2d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 1980),
cerr . d£ni££, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); H^r.nn v. Galetka, 799 F.
Supp. 1129, 1131 (D. Utah 1992).

The "other 'class-based

animus'" language of this requirement has been narrowly construed
and does not, for example, reach conspiracies motivated by an
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economic or commercial bias."

Tilton 6 F.3d at 68 6.

"In fact,

the Supreme Court has held that 'it is a close question whether
§1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than
animus against Negroes and those who championed their case.'" Id.
(quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America. Local
610. AFL-CTO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837 (1983)).
It is clear from the plaintiff's complaint that he is not
claiming that the conspiracy was movitated by some race based
discriminatory animus. Thus, that leaves the question of whether
plaintiff has alleged facts supporting a class-based
discriminatory purpose.

A class of individuals that is

"suffering from [a] discriminatory animus must be comprised of
members defined by immutable characteristics for which the
members of the alleged class have no responsibility, e.g., racial
or sexual characteristics."

Taylor. 661 F. Supp. at 1347; s^SL

Silkwood. 637 F.2d at 747 (no class-based animus directed toward
group "which did not tend to exist prior to the occurrence of the
events set forth in the complaint and which [tended] to be
defined by one particular activity or by plaintiff's individual
situation") . Here, plaintiff contends that he is a member of a
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class of uplea bargainers'' who have been discriminated against as
a result of a "conspiracy."

The Court finds, however, that for

purposes of § 1985 liability, uplea bargainers" are not a
protected class of individuals with characteristics not
susceptible to change, and for which the members of the alleged
class have no responsibility.

While criminal defendants who

choose to enter into a plea agreement may find themselves as part
of group of "plea bargainers," that group is defined by one
particular activity that results from the individual's choices
and situtation.
Thus, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim under
§1985(3), and should be dismissed, where plaintiff has not
alleged sufficient facts indicating a conspiracy by the
defendants, any act in furtherance of such a conspiracy, or any
racial or class-based animus.

Similarly, plaintiff also fails to

state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

An indispensible

prerequisite for a 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim, under the express
terms of the statute, is the existence of a conspiracy actionable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.

In light of the Court's finding as to

plaintiff's §1985(3) claim, dismissal of the § 1986 claim is also
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appropriate.
Mont.

See Wacar v . H a s e n k r u g .

486 ? . S u p p . 4 7 , 51 (D.

1980).

Ill . Immunity from Su-ir
Absolute Immunity
Several of the defendants raise absolute immunity as an
additional basis for dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. In
the context of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985,
courts have granted absolute immunity to judges, and absolute
quasi-judicial immunity to those who have comparable functions,
in order to promote independent decision making free from undue
influence, to prevent unfounded litigation, and to protect
against -disabling threats.

Seg Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800 (1982); Butz v. Economou. 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Imfrler v,
Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547
(1967) .
In addressing the defendants' arguments, the Court divides
the defendants into two groups, based on the nature of their
function, in order to determine the applicability of the type of
immunity claimed. The first group consists of Utah State Court
Judges Cornaby, Rigtrup, Sawaya, Tibbs, Murphy and Wahlquisc and
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United States District Court Judge Sam, who all claim absolute
judicial immunity from suit.

The second group, claiming absolute

quasi-judicial immunity, consists of unon-judicial" defendants
Namba, prosecutor; Valeika, AP&P investigator; and Haun and
Sibbett, parole board members.
"[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from
an ultimate assessment of damages."
286, 288 (1991) .

Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct.

"The appropriate inquiry in determining whether

a particular judge is immune is whether the challenged action was
'judicial,' and whether at the time the challenged action was
taken, the judge had subject matter jurisdiction."
Holloway. 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986).

Van Sickle v.

In other words,

judges are liable only when their actions are taken in a nonjudicial capacity or when they fall completely outside the scope
of their jurisdiction; however, judges are entitled to absolute
immunity "even when their action is erroneous, malicious, or in
excess of their judicial authority."

Id.: accord Mireles, 112

S.Ct. at 288; Piftrson. 386 U.S. at 554.

In determining whether

an act performed by a judge is a "judicial" one, the court must
decide whether the act "is a function normally performed by a
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judge/' examining the "xnature' and * function' of the act, [and]
not the *act itself.'"

Mirel^s. 112 S.Ct. at 288 (quoting stur?

v. Soarkman. 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)).
Additionally, in applying the doctrine of judicial immunity
to civil rights claims, no distinctions have been made between
state and federal judges.

Van Sickle. 791 F.2d at 1435.

In Van

Sickle, the Tenth Circuit examined the issue of judicial immunity
for both state and federal judges who had been involved in
hearing and deciding Van Sickle's underlying actions.

The court

determined that:
Whether the allegations with respect to these
defendants are considered under a Bivens type
of constitutional tort theory, [citation
omitted], or the allegations of a conspiracy
are considered a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§1985, the federal judges in this case are
absolutely immune from liability. [Footnote
omitted.] In Economou. [citation omitted],
the Supreme Court stated that it is
'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes
of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits
brought directly under the Constitution
against federal officials.'
Van Sickle. 791 F.2d at 1435.
In the instant case, the plaintiff's Amended Complaint does
not contain any allegations that the state and federal judges,
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named as defendants, acted in a non-judicial capacity or outside
the scope of their jurisdiction.

In fact, this case provides the

classic example for which the doctrine of judicial immunity was
intended, i.e., to shield judges, such as the defendants in this
case, from the harassment and intimidation of a disgruntled
litigant who disagrees with the judicial action taken in his
numerous underlying cases.

Consequently, the doctrine of

judicial immunity bars the plaintiff's claims against Utah State
Court Judges Cornaby, Rigtrup, Sawaya, Tibbs, Murphy and
Wahlquist, and United States District Court Judge Sam.
Moreover, the doctrine of absolute immunity has been
extended to non-judicial state actors in limited circumstances.
Applying a "functional" approach to questions of absolute
immunity, the Supreme Court has determined that u'[i]mmunity is
justified and defined by the functions

it protects and serves,

not by the person to whom it attaches.'" Valdez v. City

and

County of Denver. 878 F.2d 1285, 1287 (10th Cir. 1989).
"Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized not only the
absolute civil immunity of judges for conduct within their
judicial domain,. . . but also the %quasi-judicial' civil
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immunity" of such individuals as prosecutors, witnesses, jurors,
agency officials, probation officers and parole board members,
for those acts that are considered "intertwined with the judicial
process."

IsL.; see also Imbler. 424 U.S. at 431 (prosecutor

absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for his or her
actions in initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's
case); Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988)
(parole board members have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from
"damages liability for actions taken in performance of the
[b]oard's official duties regarding the granting or denying of
parole"); Tripati v. United States I.N.S.. 784 F.2d 345, 348
(10th Cir. 1986) (probation officer's preparation of presentence
report intimately associated with judicial phase of criminal
process, thereby entitling said officer to absolute immunity),
cerr. den red:. 484 U.S. 1028 (1988).
Defendants Namba, Valeika, Haun and Sibbett argue that they
are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their
respective roles as a prosecutor, probation investigator and
parole board member.

The primary allegations in the plaintiff's

comolaint that concern defendant Namba center on Namba's role as
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the prosecuting attorney in plaintiff's underlying criminal
action.

Plaintiff alleges that Namba (1) conspired to nullify

plaintiff's plea bargain; (2) recommended plaintiff's defense
counsel, Steve Vanderlinden; (3) prepared the June 21, 1988
affidavit; and (4) drafted the original charge affidavit.

It is

clearly established that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from
damages liability for any actions associated with the prosecution
of a defendant in a criminal action, including negotiating a plea
bargain.

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons. 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2615 (1993);

Imfrler, 424 U.S. at 431; Dicesare v. Stuart. 12 F.3d 973, 977
(10th Cir. 1993); Hammond v. Bales. 843 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (10th
Cir. 1988).

In the instant case, the Court finds that defendant

Namba's actions, as alleged in the complaint, occurred while he
was acting in his role as an advocate for the state.
Accordingly, defendant Namba is entitled to absolute immunity
from liability for those actions.
Similarly, plaintiff's claims against defendant Valeika are
based on her actions in exercising her responsibilities as an
Adult Probation and Parole investigator in preparing the
plaintiff's presentence report.

Probation officers who assist
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the court in sentencing determinations perform critical roles in
the judicial process in criminal cases.
348.

In fact,

ux

Tripati. 784 F.2d at

[a] presentence report is prepared exclusively

at the discretion of and for the benefit of the court.'"

Id.

(quoting United States v. Dingle. 546 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (10th
Cir. 1976)).

Thus, the defendant Valeika is absolutly immune

from civil liability where her activity in preparing plaintiff's
presentence report was so intimately associated with the judicial
process.
Finally, plaintiff alleges claims against defendants Haun
and Sibbett for actions taken in their roles as parole board
members in conducting the plaintiff's parole hearings. Due to
the wjudicial" nature of parole hearings, the Tenth Circuit held
in Knoll v. Webster, that members of a parole board have absolute
immunity "from damages liability for actions taken in performance
of the [b]oard's official duties regarding the granting or
denying of parole."

838 F.2d at 451; accord Rns? v, Uppah, 972

F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992).

Here, the Court finds that

defendants Haun and Sibbett are absolutely immune from civil
liability for their actions as parole board members.
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Qualified Immunity
State defendants, assistant attorneys general, Larsen,
Micklos, Miller, Torgensen and Carlson; court clerk, Ludwig; and
Department of Corrections officials DeLand, McCotter, Barnes and
Van Der Veur, argue that, as state officials, they are protected
from plaintiff's claims by the doctrine of qualified or "good
faith" immunity.
The doctrine of qualified or "good faith" immunity was
established in order to, under certain circumstances, shield
public officers charged with discretionary functions from the
liability and burdens associated with trial so as to avoid undue
interference with their duties.

E.g., Beard v. City of

NorthglPnn. Colo.. 24 F.3d 110, 113 (10th Cir. 1994).

Under the

objective standard for qualified immunity established in Harlow
v. Fir-gprald. 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court identified a twofold inquiry:
A public officer will only be held liable for
his conduct if it can be shown [1] that he
trenched upon a plaintiff's clearly
established constitutional or statutory right
and [2] if a reasonable person in the
defendant officer's position would have known
his conduct violated that right.
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Beard; 24 F.3d at 114; acCQrd Brunina v. Pivlgr. 949 F.2d 352,
356 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied. 112 S.Ct. 1943 (1992); Salmon
v, Scfrwarz, 3 4 8 F - 2 d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1991); Snell v.
Tunnel1, 920 F.2d 673, 696 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 449
U.S. 976 (1991).

Whether the defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity is a "legal, not a factual, issue which must be resolved
in the first instance by the trial court."

Snell. 920 F.2d at

696.
Because the doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to
protect a defendant from both liability and suit, "prior to
filing an affirmative defense, a defendant can challenge a
complaint by filing either a motion to dismiss or a motion for
summary judgment if the plaintiff has failed to come forward with
facts or allegations that establish that the defendant has
violated clearly established law."

Sawyer v. County of Creek,

908 F.2d 663, 665 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasis supplied); accord
Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio. 847 F.2d 642, 646
(10th Cir. 1988) . "When the defense of qualified immunity has
been raised by the defendant, the plaintiff then has the burden
to show with particularity facts and law establishing the
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inference that the defendants violated a constitutional right."
Walter v. Morton. 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994).

Thus,

Mujnless and until the plaintiff both demonstrates a clearly
established right and comes forward with the necessary factual
allegations, the 'governmental official is properly spared the
burden and expense of proceeding any further."1 Sawyer, 908 F.2d
at 666 (quoting Powell v. Mikulecky. 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th
Cir. 1989)); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers. 847 F.2d at 646.
In light of this Court's earlier finding concerning the
deficiencies of the plaintiff's amended complaint, it is evident
that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts
supporting a claim that the defendants violated clearly
established law.

The plaintiff must do more than "simply allege

abstract violations."
Cir. 1994).

Guffey v. Wyatt. 18 F.3d 869, 871 (10th

Additionally, where the plaintiff fails to allege

sufficient facts to support a claim that the "conduct complained
of violated the law as presently interpreted, it is unnecessary
to consider whether the law was clearly established at the time
such conduct occurred."

Snail, 920 F.2d at 696 n.21.

The Court finds that state defendants, Larsen, Micklos,
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Miller, Torgensen, Carlson, Ludwig, DeLand, McCctter, Barnes
and Van Der Veur, are entitled to qualified immunity from suit5
because the amended complaint is completely void of sufficient
factual allegations to support a claim that these defendants
violated clearly established law.
IV. Other Grounds for Dismissal
Defendant Edmonds, who acted as plaintiff's appellate
counsel, argues that he should be dismissed from this action
because (1) he was not a "state actor," for purposes of § 1983
liability, and (2) the plaintiff's vague and ccnclusory

5

In Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth
Circuit expressly held that the doctrine of qualified immunity
applies in the context of both § 1983 and § 1985 claims. The
rationale adopted by the court was that:
The justifications for the doctrine of
qualified immunity enunciated in Harlow are
equally present in section 1985 claims
regardless of the added requirement of racial
or class-based animus. If public officials
are not allowed to assert qualified immunity
under section 1985, then suits may divert
these officials' energies away from their
public obligations; individuals will be
deterred from holding public office; and
officials will be chilled in the exercise of
their duties.
Id., at 1102.
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allegations concerning an alleged conspiracy are insufficient to
state a cause of action against him.
It is clearly established that to state a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1933, the plaintiff must allege that Edmonds
violated a constitutional right while acting under color of state
law

-

Ruark v, SQlaRQi 928 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir. 1991).

A

lawyer does not act under color of state law when performing his
or her traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a
criminal proceeding, or appeal therefrom.

&££ Polk County v.

U2&SQT1, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Hunt v. Bennett. 17 F.3d 1263,
1268 (10th Cir. 1994), cert-. denied, 115 S.Ct. 107 (1994).

One

noted exception to the above-stated rule has been recognized
where criminal defense attorneys are involved in conspiratorial
acts with state officials, which results in the deprivation of
their client's constitutional rights.
914, 923 (1984) .

Tower v. Glover. 467 U.S.

This exception does net apply here, where the

Court has already determined that the plaintiff has inadequately
pled a conspiracy claim.

Plaintiff's claim against defendant

Edmonds should, therefore, be dismissed.
Additionally, plaintiff fails to state a claim against
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defendant Sheffield, who functions as the Executive Director,
Secretary and Examiner of the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission.
Unquestionably, the authority and jurisdiction of the Judicial
Conduct Commission, as conferred by statute, does not extend to
providing habeas corpus relief to prisoners.
§§ 78-7-27 to 78-7-30.

See Utah Code Ann.

Since the Commission has no authority or

control over the decision process affecting the plaintiff's
incarceration, it is inconceivable that defendant Sheffield
participated in the alleged conspiracy or committed any act
depriving plaintiff of a constitutional right.

Thus, in addition

to the other grounds for dismissal set forth above, plaintiff's
claims agai-nst Sheffield should be dismissed because there is no
affirmative link between the alleged constitutional deprivation
and any acts of Sheffield in his capacity as a member of the
Judicial Conduct Commission.

Durre v. Dempsey. 869 F.2d 543, 548

(10th Cir. 1989) ; accord Ruark. 928 F.2d at 950; M ^

Q

v, Grubbs,

841 F.2d 1512, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1988); Gomm v. DeLand. 729 F.
Supp. 767, 782 (D. Utah 1990), aff'd. 931 F.2d 62 (10th Cir.
1991) .

Similarly, plaintiff also fails to state a cause of action
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against defendant Ferrero; of the Utah State Bar.

Ferrero's role

in responding to plaintiff's complaints against Assistant
Attorneys General Larsen, Miller and Carlson in no way connects
him with the constitutional violations alleged in the complaint.
Again, plaintiff failed to establish the requisite affirmative
link between acts of defendant Ferraro and the alleged
constitutional deprivation; therefore, the claims against Ferrero
should be dismissed.

Duxrs., 869 F.2d at 548; accord Ruark, 928

F.2d at 950; Meade. 841 F.2d at 1527-28; Gomm. 729 F. Supp. at
782.
As to the other grounds for dismissal raised by the
defendants, i.e., insufficiency of service of process, statute of
limitations and Eleventh Amendment immunity, this Court has
determined that in light of the findings set forth above, it is
unnecessary to address these additional grounds.

RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss defendant Vanderlinden from
the action due to Mr. Vanderlinden's present incapacity.

The

Court finds that dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint,
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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), is appropriate as to all of
the remaining defendants for the following reasons: (1) plaintiff
does not have a cognizable claim under § 19S3 because plaintiffs
underlying criminal sentence has not been invalidated; (2)
plaintiff does not state a cause of action under §§ 1985 or 1986
because he has not alleged sufficient facts indicating a
conspiracy by the defendants, any act in furtherance of such a
conspiracy, or any racial or class-based animus; (3) the state
and federal court judges named as defendants are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity; (4) defendants Namba, Valeika, Haun
and Sibbett are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity; (5)
the remaining state defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
because the factual allegations in the amended complaint are
insufficient to support a claim that these defendants violated
clearly established law; (6) defendant Edmonds is not a state
actor for purposes of § 1983 liabilty; and (7) there is no
affirmative link between the acts of defendant Sheffield, as a
member of the Judicial Conduct Commission, or defendant Ferrero,
of the Utah State Bar, and any alleged constitutional
deprivation.

Therefore,
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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's amended
complaint be dismissed without prejudice.

Additionally, in light

of the fact that plaintiff has already been afforded the
opportunity to remedy the pleading defects in his complaint,
which he failed to do, this Court also recommends that Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11 sanctions be imposed should plaintiff seek to file a
further amended complaint without remedying the pleading defects
as to the conspiracy claim.
A copy of the foregoing report and recommendation is being
mailed to the parties who are hereby notified of their right to
object to the report and recommendation.

The parties are further

notified that they must file any objections to the report and
recommendation within ten (10) days after receiving it.

Failure

to file objections to both factual and legal findings may
constitute a waiver of those objections on subsequent review.
DATED this

U

day of February, 1995.

Samuel Alba
United States Magistrate Judge
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Newton C. Estes
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Mark L. Shurtleff
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330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Melvin C. Wilson
Davis County Attorney
Davis County Attorney's Office
P. 0. Box 618
Farmington, Utah 84025
Stephen J. Sorenson
Assistant United States Attorney
350 South Main Street
478 U.S. Courthouse
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Carman E. Kipp
Kirk G. Gibbs
Kipp and Christian, P.C.
City Centre I, #330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314
Dean W. Sheffield
2760 Highland Office Plaza #257
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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Jay D. Edmonds
1660 Orchard Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Michael Nielsen
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

DATED this \\%> ^^ day of February, 1995

§ecretar^~
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